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Three Essays on Financial Distress and Valuation 
Steven E. Kozlowski, PhD 
University of Connecticut, [2017] 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays examining issues related to financial distress and its impact on 
stock prices and future firm performance. In the first essay, we explore the impact of economic conditions 
on the valuation of bank discretionary loan loss provisions and expect to find a strong conditional effect.  
Driven by fluctuations in lending standards over the business cycle, we show that during good times 
increases in discretionary loan loss provisions are used to support loan growth and are associated with 
higher stock returns. In contrast, during periods of economic turmoil discretionary loan loss provisions 
are expected to indicate deeper problems in the loan portfolio and are negatively valued by the market.   
 
In the second essay, I identify an external financing channel capable of generating significant 
overvaluation among distressed firms’ stocks and explaining their puzzlingly low returns (i.e., the distress 
anomaly). Specifically, the decision of a distressed firm to raise external capital generates a large 
dispersion of investor beliefs. Consistent with predictions that prices will only reflect optimists’ 
valuations in the presence of short-sale constraints, I find distressed firms’ stocks earn comparable returns 
to healthy firms’ stocks when prior year external financing activity is low but underperform significantly 
when external financing activity is high. This underperformance is concentrated around earnings 
announcements, as optimistic investors are disappointed on average upon observing actual performance 
outcomes. 
 
The third essay examines the relation between takeover activity and the performance of distressed 
company stocks while exploring two competing explanations. The risk-based explanation predicts
Steven E. Kozlowski – University of Connecticut, [2017] 
distressed firms with a high probability of being acquired will earn lower returns, because the possibility 
of acquisition makes them less risky. Conversely, the managerial alignment explanation predicts low 
returns for distressed firms with low probability of being acquired, because without the disciplining effect 
of a possible takeover, self-interested managers have an incentive to “play it safe” and avoid risky 
investments. I find evidence consistent with the latter hypothesis, as distressed firms with low takeover 
exposure earn lower future returns while investing less, reducing leverage, and earning lower profits. 
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Chapter 1
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions: A Sign of Prosperity
or a Sign of Problems?
1
1.1 Introduction
In theory, when bank management determines it is unlikely to collect all amounts due according
to the contractual terms of its loan agreements, a loan loss provision expense is recorded in the
current period equal to the expected loss. This increases the bank’s loss reserves, which are used
to absorb future loan defaults. Thus, under regulatory guidance an unusually large loan loss
provision expense should reflect management’s expectations of elevated lending losses and convey
this information to investors. Despite this seemingly adverse news, however, prior research generally
documents a positive relation between the discretionary component of loan loss provisions (DLLP)
and bank stock returns (Wahlen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Beaver et al., 1997; Liu et al., 1997;
Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Kilic et al., 2013). While several theories for this finding have been
proposed in the literature, no comprehensive explanation has been o↵ered.
In this study, we examine the market’s reaction to discretionary loan loss provisions over several
business cycles and expect to find a strong conditional valuation e↵ect that is dependent on the state
of the economy, because the motivation for recording excess provision expenses varies dramatically
with overall economic conditions. In particular, there is substantial evidence that lending standards
vary considerably over the business cycle, with loose credit policies implemented in periods of strong
economic growth and tight policies in economic downturns (Asea and Blomberg, 1998; Ruckes, 2004;
Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012; Bassett et al., 2014). Thus, when the economy is strong and relatively few
borrowers are expected to default, many banks aim to grow their loan portfolios while pursuing
higher loan yields. Bank managers who decide to implement such growth strategies are likely to
record high DLLP in order to support new loans made under looser underwriting standards.1 With
low default rates expected to persist in good states of the economy, this leads to expectations of
higher future earnings for these banks and results in a positive market valuation of DLLP.
In contrast, during economic downturns banks tighten their underwriting standards and be-
come averse to granting higher-risk loans. Further, bank earnings tend to be depressed; therefore,
managers only record discretionary loan loss provisions as needed to cover the losses associated
with loans nearing default. Thus, based on management’s private information about its loan port-
1Evidence of this e↵ect is supported by comments from bank analysts and executives.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-bet-on-consumers-is-getting-riskier-1469221959
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folio, high DLLP indicates to the market which banks are facing the most severe default problems,
thereby causing a negative market valuation of DLLP in bad economic times.
Using a broad panel of publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) over the pe-
riod 1997–2013, we test the conditional valuation hypothesis and show that, consistent with prior
findings, DLLP expenses are positively valued by the market but only during “good times”. In
contrast, stock returns are significantly lower for banks with large discretionary provision expenses
when economic prospects are bleak. We attribute this to more widespread economic turmoil in
the market resulting in increased investor skepticism and a greater likelihood that high DLLP re-
flects management’s inside knowledge of a deteriorating loan portfolio rather than plans to increase
lending.
The adoption of more aggressive lending policies by high DLLP banks during good times is
expected to generate an increase in lending activity and provide a boost to earnings. Consistent
with our predictions, DLLP recorded during good economic times is associated with higher earnings
in the following year, which is driven primarily by an increase in net interest income from higher
interest rate loans and loan growth. However, no such relation is found during periods when the
economy is weak. As a result, while DLLP recorded during good economic times is associated with
increased earnings potential, in bad economic times DLLP’s only impact is to reduce current period
earnings.
We choose to focus on loan loss provisions for two primary reasons. First, loan loss provisions
represent what is by far the most economically significant accrual for banking institutions. The
median loan loss provision (LLP) expense as a percentage of earnings prior to taxes and LLP
expenses is 12.51% in our sample, and in 5.43% of bank-years this ratio exceeds 100% illustrating
its substantial impact on earnings. Additionally, the importance of accruals, including their e↵ect
on asset pricing, has been well documented in the literature (e.g., Sloan, 1996; Bhojraj et al., 2009).
Second, the nature of the loan loss provision expense is such that it is based on management
estimates and is highly subjective. FAS 114, which stipulates how creditors are to assess troubled
loans, directly states that “measuring impaired loans requires judgment and estimates, and the
eventual outcomes may di↵er from those estimates. Creditors should have latitude to develop
measurement methods that are practical in their circumstances.”2 Consequently, the flexibility
2Additional reserves are set aside for pools of relatively homogeneous loans under the guidance of FAS 5.
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that management is granted in determining an appropriate reserve for bank loan portfolios coupled
with the economic impact of the LLP expense make it necessary for both investors and regulators
to evaluate the information content of loan loss provisions carefully.
In order to separate the non-discretionary component of loan loss provisions from the discre-
tionary component, we control for the most essential determinants of bank loan loss provisions such
as the bank’s allowance for loan losses, non-performing loans, change in non-performing loans, and
net charge-o↵s. Further, we also consider variables reflecting loan portfolio composition as well
as changes in portfolio composition, which are frequently ignored in prior studies. We find the
majority of these control variables are significant in predicting loan loss provisions with coe cients
of varying magnitudes, suggesting that it is important to take this information into account when
estimating DLLP.
Our study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we document a strong
conditional valuation e↵ect of DLLP in our panel of BHCs using a set of variables reflecting market-
wide economic conditions including real GDP growth, industry Tobin’s Q, o cial business cycle
dates, and consumer sentiment. We provide evidence that not only do discretionary loan loss
provisions no longer convey positive information to investors when the economy is weak, but that
during the financial crisis when economic concerns intensified the stocks of banks with high DLLP
were severely punished by the market.
Second, we provide evidence that DLLP is associated with significant di↵erences in future
operating performance. Consistent with high DLLP banks relaxing underwriting standards when
the economy is strong, these banks experience both higher loan growth and higher overall earnings
compared to other banks in the following year, which is driven by increased net-interest income. In
contrast, during bad economic times high DLLP banks have similar future loan growth and earnings
performance to other banks but sustain a hit to current period earnings from increased provision
expenses. These results are consistent with the conditional valuation hypothesis and indicate what
value-relevant information DLLP provides to the market.
Third, we address potential endogeneity concerns often ignored by prior studies. We create
a matched sample between banks in the top quintile of DLLP and comparable banks with lower
levels of DLLP. This helps ensure the market’s reaction to DLLP is not confounded by di↵erences
in other return determinants and aids in quantifying the economic magnitude of the e↵ect. We
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also examine the return performance of high DLLP banks compared to low DLLP banks around
events that altered the perceived health of financial institutions. The results add support to our
conditional valuation hypothesis, as high DLLP banks earned significantly lower returns around the
IndyMac bank failure, which represented the largest commercial bank failure in nearly two decades
and intensified default concerns, while this group of banks also experienced the most positive returns
upon the announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) intended to help alleviate
financial distress.
Our paper is related to the literature on lending cycles, which play a key role in driving fluctu-
ations in loan loss provisions over time. For instance, Asea and Blomberg (1998) explore a dataset
consisting of over two million commercial and industrial loans and show that credit policies fluctu-
ate systematically over the business cycle, with lax lending polices implemented during expansions
and tighter policies in recessions, which influences the overall health of the economy. Additionally,
Bassett et al. (2014) study credit supply shocks using survey data comprised of bank-level responses
on lending standards. They note the most commonly cited reasons for banks to alter lending stan-
dards are changes in the economic outlook and shifts in risk tolerance. This is consistent with our
evidence and helps explain why banks record DLLP when implementing more aggressive lending
strategies during economic booms while only recording additional provision expenses as needed to
cover losses during downturns.
Our study is also closely related to the literature on the market recognition of accounting
discretion and bank valuation. Huizinga and Laeven (2012) o↵er evidence that the use of accounting
discretion was widespread in 2008, as investors placed significant discounts on bank assets whose
value was likely to be overstated. Our results are consistent with their findings in the sense that
investors punish high DLLP bank valuations during market downturns when fundamentals and
underlying asset quality are likely to be weak. To our knowledge we are the first to explore the
market’s assessment of bank loan loss provisions conditional on the business cycle, which is closely
related due to the dynamics in lending and appears to be of first order importance in explaining
the DLLP valuation e↵ect.
One possible concern is that the conditional valuation of DLLP could create an incentive for
all banks to record higher DLLP in good times and lower DLLP in bad times with the goal of
increasing their valuations; however, recording higher DLLP is costly since it reduces both current
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earnings and Tier 1 capital. Such a reduction in a bank’s financial ratios can lead to higher external
financing costs, higher insurance premiums, and higher supervisory risk ratings, thereby limiting the
incentives for banks to record high DLLP when it is unnecessary. In contrast, there are far lower
costs associated with under-reporting loan loss provisions, since in addition to being associated
with higher valuations in bad times, it also increases bank earnings and Tier 1 capital, which is
particularly valuable given the higher external financing costs during downturns. This highlights
the need for regulators to scrutinize loan loss provisions more heavily during bad times, as this is
when banks have the greatest incentive to overstate their true financial condition.
As noted in Beatty and Liao (2014), few studies utilizing a broad panel of banking institutions
have examined the valuation e↵ects of DLLP subsequent to the mid 1990s. More recent studies
have tended to focus on a subset of banks such as those audited by the largest accounting firms
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2009) or those utilizing derivatives (Kilic et al., 2013). One possible expla-
nation for this is that when failing to condition on a measure of economic outlook, we find the
estimated impact of DLLP on returns to be negative and insignificant. Our study helps to fill this
gap in the literature while providing an explanation for the strong conditional valuation e↵ect.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the existing literature on
DLLP valuation and credit cycles and also outlines our hypotheses. Section 1.3 describes the data
and provides summary statistics. Section 1.4 outlines our methodology and the empirical tests that
follow. Section 1.5 presents the results and discusses our findings. Section 1.6 o↵ers a series of
robustness tests. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Hypothesis Development
1.2.1 Background
A number of studies have explored the valuation implications of loan loss provisions because of
their significant impact on bank financial statements in addition to the large degree of information
asymmetry between bank management and market participants. The traditional view predicts
a negative relation between DLLP and stock returns, because investors are unlikely to be fully
informed about the health of bank loan portfolios. As a result, positive DLLP reveals to market
participants that expected loan defaults are higher than anticipated based on portfolio characteristics,
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which elicits a negative stock price response. However, Beaver et al. (1989) provide initial evidence
on this topic and document a surprising positive relation between a bank’s allowance for loan losses,
which reflects total accumulated reserves (provisions) for loan losses, and its market-to-book ratio.
They reason that an observed increase in the allowance for loan losses account may be seen as
positive news, because it conveys that the bank is able to absorb the “hit to earnings” associated
with recording additional provision expenses. Elliott et al. (1991) o↵er a similar explanation
suggesting the market interprets increased loan loss provisions as a sign of a bank’s willingness
to deal with problem loans, thus, creating a positive stock price reaction in response to loan loss
reserve announcements. This argument assumes that investors are not negatively surprised by the
extent of predicted loan losses for high DLLP banks and that loan loss provisions are associated
with beneficial management actions that mitigate risk. Consistent with the traditional view we
expect investors will not typically be fully informed about the extent of bank loan losses, leading to
a negative stock price reaction to DLLP when the economy is weak and default levels are elevated.
Subsequently, researchers attempted to o↵er more direct evidence for why investors seemed to
value provision expenses positively, as it contradicts the traditional view that loan loss provisions
simply reflect expected future losses. Along these lines, Wahlen (1994) shows that when condi-
tioning on unexpected non-performing loans and unexpected charge-o↵s, discretionary provisions
are associated with both higher stock returns and higher future cash flows. Although this study
fails to identify the mechanism leading to stronger future performance among banks with increased
provisions, it highlights that there is a discretionary component of loan loss provisions that pro-
vides investors with unique value-relevant information. Liu et al. (1997), however, show that these
positive valuation implications only hold for low regulatory capital banks in the fourth fiscal quar-
ter. Although their results are consistent with prior theories o↵ered in the literature, such as loss
provisions reflecting management’s commitment to resolving problem loans which is important for
low capital banks, they are also consistent with provisions mechanically helping to alleviate capital
constraints in the pre-BASEL period when bank reserves were counted as part of Tier 1 capital.3
As a result, there is insu cient evidence to draw strong conclusions from their work regarding the
source of positive information discretionary provisions provided to the market and whether this
3Prior to 1989 regulatory changes the allowance for loan losses account was included in bank Tier 1 capital;
however, afterwards it is only included as part of Tier 2 capital up to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets.
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relation should be expected to persist under the revised (current) capital standards. For the same
reason, we advise readers to use caution when comparing our results with studies on the valuation
of loan loss provisions in the pre-1989 period, as the positive mechanical impact of loan loss pro-
visioning on bank capital in this earlier regime may or may not outweigh the negative information
content of DLLP during downturns.
Beatty and Liao (2014) highlight that most studies examining the valuation e↵ects of loan loss
provisions utilized samples concentrated in the pre-BASEL period, and “were only focused on the
signaling hypothesis of loan loss provisions without considering the valuation of other properties
of provisions.” Additionally, subsequent research has utilized small subsamples to address specific
questions regarding the information content of loan loss provisions without exploring DLLP valua-
tion more broadly. For instance, Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) predict that discretionary provisions
will be more informative for banks audited by one of the Big 5 auditing firms in their sample and
particularly so if the auditing firm was a leader in the banking industry. Consistent with this they
find discretionary provisions are positively and significantly valued primarily for banks audited by
one of these firms; however, they do not attempt to determine what actions high DLLP banks take
to enhance shareholder value. One possible benefit of recording provisions early is noted in Beatty
and Liao (2011) who show banks that build-up su cient reserves during good times to absorb the
credit losses in subsequent downturns are forced to cut lending less significantly in recessions and
can avoid having to raise additional capital when it is most costly. Likewise, Laeven and Majnoni
(2003) claim that “a prudent bank should show a positive association between the amount of loan
loss provisions and the growth rate of its loan portfolio.” Similarly, our work suggests banks benefit
by building up reserves to support loan growth in times of expansion. We focus on providing a
better understanding of the information content of DLLP and how it varies with overall economic
conditions.
1.2.2 Impact of Credit Cycles
A related body of work within the finance literature that motivates our hypotheses explores
credit cycles – the notion that banks and other institutions ease lending standards in boom peri-
ods when expected defaults are low while greatly tightening lending standards in downturns when
expected defaults are high. Such variation in credit policies is directly related to loan loss provi-
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sioning, since it is associated with both the riskiness of new loans as well as the likelihood of default
on existing loans. Highlighting these periodic shifts in lending practices, Ruckes (2004) presents a
model that ties variation in credit policies to changing economic conditions over the business cycle.
His model demonstrates that when the economy enters a boom phase banks have less incentive
to evaluate borrowers thoroughly since screening is costly and the average quality of borrowers is
high. This leads to price competition among lenders and even higher risk borrowers are funded,
because default is gauged to be unlikely. In contrast, during severe recessions the average quality
of borrowers is low, and banks rationally choose not to spend significant resources on screening
and instead implement restrictive lending policies. In our context, the model suggests that when
the economy is weak, DLLP should be highest for banks experiencing loan portfolio quality issues,
consistent with the traditional view of loan loss provisioning. In contrast, when the economy is
strong and expected defaults are low, banks have an incentive to use DLLP to support loan growth
facilitated by relaxed underwriting standards, which can lead to higher earnings and a positive
market response as was found in the prior literature.
Evidence of countercyclical lending standards has also been demonstrated empirically. Asea and
Blomberg (1998) study a sample of commercial and industrial loans and find that banks provide
credit to borrowers on more lenient terms during expansions, whereas they charge higher risk
premia on loans and increase collateral requirements during recessions. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012)
also provide evidence that mortgage denial rates were lower in high credit growth areas and lenders
placed less weight on applicants’ loan-to-income ratios in these regions. This suggests that new
loans are granted more freely when economic growth is strong and near-term default risk is low in
order to boost earnings. Further, Bassett et al. (2014) develop a unique credit supply indicator using
the Federal Reserve’s Loan O cer Opinion Survey, which queries banks about changes in lending
standards for major loan types. Macroeconomic factors and shifts in risk tolerance are among the
most commonly cited reasons for tightened lending standards, and their figures suggest credit access
was most restricted during the 2001 recession and 2007–2009 financial crisis. As anticipated, 2008
represented the peak in lending tightness. Consequently, our study focuses on the related impact
on bank loan loss provisioning and its valuation e↵ects, as the information content of DLLP should
vary substantially with underwriting standards and default expectations.
It is conceivable that some banks could attempt to relax their credit standards when the economy
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is strong without recording heightened loan loss provisions; however, there are two primary factors
that are likely to prevent this from occurring. First, although loan loss provisioning practices are
based on the “incurred-loss” model, which only requires that reserves are made for losses that
are probable and can be reasonably estimated, remarks from Dugan (2009) of The O ce of the
Comptroller of the Currency suggest regulators encouraged bankers to use “judgment that takes
into account other forward-leaning factors, such as changes in underwriting standards and changes
in the economic environment that would have an impact on loan losses.” This indicates that
regulatory pressures encourage banks to build-up reserves through reporting discretion when they
plan to increase their risk-taking.
Additionally, several papers document benefits to recording timely provisions during expansions
rather than waiting until substantial losses begin to materialize during downturns. For example,
Beatty and Liao (2011) provide evidence that banks that record more timely provisions are forced
to reduce lending less during recessions and are less subject to capital crunches, and Bushman and
Williams (2012) note that forward-looking provisioning is associated with enhanced risk-taking
discipline. Bushman and Williams (2015) and Andreou et al. (2017) also indicate that failing to
establish su cient reserves during good times subjects banks to increased crash risk and greater
capital inadequacy concerns in recessions. Such benefits are consistent with DLLP being associated
with higher market valuations in good times, as was typically found in the early literature.
In a related study, Thakor (2016) develops a theoretical model to explain how shifts in risk
assessment can occur within the banking industry, which contributes to lax lending policies in
expansions and tight policies in recessions. In this model, a series of successfully repaid loans causes
market participants, including investors and regulators, to increase their beliefs about bankers’ skill
levels and risk management abilities enabling banks to take on riskier lending until creditors realize
that favorable outcomes were based on chance or until defaults increase leading to an eventual
crash. As a consequence of this cyclical variation in risk assessment and lending standards, we
expect to find a strong conditional valuation of discretionary loan loss provisions.
In particular, banks that loosen their underwriting standards during economic booms in search
of higher yields and loan growth rates will tend to increase loan loss provisions (reserves) to protect
against an increase in default risk. As a result, investors will expect higher profits for these banks
due to higher net interest margins on risky loans and lower default rates in boom periods, thereby
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leading to a positive market reaction to discretionary loan loss provisions. In contrast, during re-
cessions banks reduce overall lending and only provide credit to the lowest credit risk borrowers, so
increases in discretionary loan loss provisions will predominantly reflect the impaired credit quality
of existing loans and higher expected default rates. This results in a negative valuation of loss
provisions. Essentially, discretionary loan loss provisions in bad times reveal to the market which
banks have been most adversely impacted by the downturn. This leads to our main hypothesis:
Conditional Valuation Hypothesis (CVH). Investors value discretionary loan loss provisions
positively in good economic times but negatively in bad economic times.
This view that the information revealed by discretionary loan loss provisions is conditional on
economic conditions is also in agreement with recent statements from bank executives that while
the economy remains strong overall, “some lenders are lowering credit-score requirements and tak-
ing on riskier customers.” As a result, additions to loan loss reserves reflect e↵orts to increase
loan volume.4 By relaxing their underwriting standards, banks are looking to increase revenues at
a time when conservative loans o↵er relatively low margins. This leads us to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Banks that record higher discretionary loan loss provisions during good economic
times will experience higher future earnings and loan growth. Conversely, when the economy is
weak increased loss provisions will o↵er no information related to future bank performance.
Wahlen (1994) suggests that, “because accounting for loan loss provisions requires management
judgment, investors are likely to interpret unexpected provisions as the sum of management’s
expectations of future loan losses plus a discretionary component.” Our hypotheses also reflect
this view, and by accounting for the variation in lending standards over the business cycle we are
able to evaluate what information the market gains from the discretionary (unexpected) portion of
loan loss provisions. In summary, when times are good the expectations of future loan losses are
minimal and the discretionary component of loan loss provisions is associated with bank e↵orts to
enhance loan volume. Conversely, during economic downturns management’s expectation of future
4 http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-bet-on-consumers-is-getting-riskier-1469221959
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loan losses is the dominant component of DLLP and serves to inform market participants about
the extent of banks’ expected loan defaults.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
1.3.1 Data Description
Bank holding company data is obtained from the Bank Regulatory database, which maintains
data collected from the FR Y-9C consolidated financial statements of bank holding companies.
We form our sample by taking all bank holding companies with non-missing annual data on LLP
expenses and the control variables necessary to predict the expected level of LLP in addition to
available return data. The CRSP-FRB Link provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
website is used to match the bank identifier, rssdid, from the Bank Regulatory database with the
corresponding permco found in CRSP.5
Our sample period spans from 1997 to 2013, which successfully captures the expansionary period
leading up to the dot-com bubble in which economic concerns were limited as well as both the 2001
and 2007–2009 recessions. The data in Bank Regulatory is incomplete before 2000, so we merge in
data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago on non-performing loans for financial statements
filed between 1996 (to account for lagged predictors) and 1999 by matching year and rssdid.6. We
drop all observations with missing return data as well as observations where the listed institution
type is not a BHC. This results in our final sample of 767 unique BHCs and 6,046 bank-year
observations.
In constructing the explanatory variables for estimating DLLP, we scale all accounting variables
by prior year-end total assets. This helps to mitigate issues with skewness and accounts for di↵er-
ences in size. Additionally, we lag accounting data from bank regulatory filings by four months to
ensure all information is publicly available. Cumulative stock returns are then computed over the
corresponding twelve months.
To examine the impact of business conditions on DLLP valuation, we generate several indicator
variables that reflect the strength of the overall economy. For our first measure we define the
5Linking table available at: https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking research/datasets.html
6We merge in data for line items bhck5525 and bhck5526 used to compute non-performing loans, which come from
Schedule HC-N. Data is obtained at the following website: https://www.chicagofed.org/applications/bhc/bhc-home
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variable, LowGDP, which is equal to one if the growth in real GDP was below its time series
median and zero otherwise. Growth in real GDP is a primary variable used in Bassett et al. (2014)
to capture the state of the economy and provides a good indication of overall economic activity.
For our second measure, following Wang et al. (2010), we proxy for the perceived strength of
the economy using the industry median Tobin’s Q, computed as the market value of assets scaled
by the book value of assets. In theory, when investors expect good times ahead, they will be willing
to pay more for the assets of the bank resulting in a higher value of Q. At the end of each year we
construct the variable QLow, which takes the value one when the median bank Tobin’s Q is below
its time series median and zero otherwise.
Next, we generate a recession dummy, REC, which is equal to one if the economy was determined
to be in a recession at the end of the annual holding period according to the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) business dating cycle and zero otherwise. By doing so, we define the
holding periods ending in 2001, 2008, and 2009 as recessionary periods. Although analyzing years
according to the NBER recession definition provides a way to study the market’s reaction to DLLP
conditional on economic conditions, its usefulness may be limited since relatively few periods are
considered to be o cial recessions. Further, there may exist times when the economy was relatively
weak and market participants had significant concerns related to expected defaults despite these
periods not being defined as o cial recessions. For these reasons we expect recessionary periods to
capture times of extreme economic weakness but fail to isolate times of economic strength.
For our final proxy of economic conditions we use the Index of Consumer Sentiment obtained
from the University of Michigan, which is useful for distinguishing between times of relative opti-
mism and pessimism.7 This measure is derived from survey responses from a representative sample
of U.S. households and has a natural correlation to the business cycle, as the index value is based on
the percentage of favorable versus unfavorable replies for five questions pertaining to both current
and future economic conditions. To generate our indicator variable, we first record the value of
the Index of Consumer Sentiment at the end of each holding period. We then compute the median
index value across the full sample and define a variable, SENT, equal to one in any year when the
7Data available at https://data.sca.isr.umich.edu/data-archive/mine.php. Data is obtained through the Survey of
Consumers, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. This data is also available through the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago webpage and is listed under “IBEX Consumer Sentiment.”
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index value is below its time series median and zero otherwise.8
The extent to which the Consumer Sentiment Index correlates with the business cycle can be
seen in Figure 1.1. There is a distinct decline in the value of the index during each of the five
recessions since its inception in 1978. This is unsurprising as individuals are expected to be more
pessimistic during times of economic hardship. The index also provides a real-time tracking of
sentiment levels, as its value is published monthly based on new survey responses, whereas o cial
recession dating is not established until after the fact when the business cycle dating committee
can definitively identify a peak or trough in economic activity. Finally, we note the extent of the
decline in the index was more severe for deeper recessions such as the 2007–2009 recession relative
to the recession of 2001, which was less extreme. This provides some assurance that the index is
successful in capturing market sentiment.
1.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in estimating the discretionary and
non-discretionary components of bank LLP expenses. The statistics are based on the full sample
containing 6,046 bank-year observations. Our main variable of interest, LLP, is computed as the
ratio of bank loan loss provision expenses in year t to total assets from year-end t–1. To enhance
the readability of coe cients in our later regression analysis, we multiply this value by 100, which
converts it to a percentage of the BHC’s total assets as of the beginning of the year.9 The median
bank-year involves a loan loss provision expense equal to approximately 0.25% of total assets. While
it may be di cult to judge the economic significance of the LLP expense based solely on this ratio,
when compared to the median ratio of bank income before loan loss provision and tax expenses to
total assets (EBTP) of 1.82%, it is clear that it often has a material impact on bank performance.
Further, there is substantial variation among BHCs in regard to the amount of loan loss expenses
they incur in a given year, as evidenced by LLP’s standard deviation of 0.70%. There are many
factors that contribute to such variation including bank risk taking, loan portfolio composition,
regulatory scrutiny, and overall economic conditions. For instance, highly elevated levels of LLP
8We also looked at changes in the index value, which has a positive correlation with the index level; however, we
expect the index level to perform better since there may be some periods where economic conditions are improving
but still relatively poor. This is the case in several years at the end of our sample period.
9Details on variable construction can be found in Appendix Table A1.1.
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expenses are expected during years in which the economy is struggling and borrower default is
more likely. Also worth noting is that the median value of bank allowance for loan losses (ALL),
which acts as a reserve account for future losses, is equal to 0.91% of total assets. This suggests the
typical bank in our sample has su cient reserves set aside to absorb several years worth of average
sized loan losses.
It is also clear that loans represent an important asset for the vast majority of BHCs in our
sample. Within bank loan portfolios, real estate loans tend to represent the largest component.
The variable computed as real estate loans to total assets, RE, has a mean (median) value of 46.86%
(47.93%). Commercial and Industrial loans, CI, represent a large but less substantial portion of
total assets with a mean (median) value of 10.99% (9.45%). We also compute the value of all
other loans, which has a mean (median) value of 7.94% (5.81%). This segment consists primarily of
consumer loans, including loans for automobiles, education, and credit cards, and is pooled together
as it represents a small portion of the typical balance sheet. Also reported are statistics for changes
in each loan segment as a percentage of total assets. These variables indicate that the percentage
of funds loaned out was generally increasing during our sample period as the means and medians
for all three loan segment growth variables are greater than zero.
Panel B of Table 1.1 presents data on bank stock returns and control variables that are known
predictors of stock returns. EXRET represents the annual bank stock return in excess of the one-
year risk-free rate.10 The mean (median) annual excess return during our sample is 8.23% (6.20%).
Also included are statistics for the log of bank market value of equity (Log(Size)) and log book-
to-market (Log(BTM)). These variables are used to control for the well-known e↵ects of size and
value, respectively.
1.4 Methodology
1.4.1 Estimating Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions (DLLP)
To test our conditional valuation hypothesis, it is first necessary to partition bank loan loss
provision expenses into a discretionary and non-discretionary component. It has been well docu-
mented that a large degree of estimation and subjectivity is involved in determining the loan loss
10 Data on risk-free returns used in the construction of this variable are obtained from Ken French’s Data Library.
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provision expense, but while it is undeniable that room for managerial discretion exists, there are
also many factors that necessitate additional loan loss provisions. For instance, a BHC with a large
increase in non-performing loans, in which borrowers are failing to make payments in accordance
with the terms of their loan contracts, would require a large loan loss provision to cover the higher
expected losses.11
Following prior literature, we estimate a bank’s required level of loan loss provision (LLP)
expenses by taking the fitted value from a regression model that controls for known determinants
of LLP. Most of the control variables have clear theoretical motivation and are used widely in prior
research, while others such as the loan type variables are infrequently used but reflect important
di↵erences in risk exposure. Our LLP estimation equation is shown below in equation 1.1.
LLPi,t =  0 +  1ALLi,t 1 +  2NPLi,t 1 +  3 NPLi,t +  4REi,t 1 +  5 REi,t (1.1)
+  6CIi,t 1 +  7 CIi,t +  8OtherLoansi,t 1 +  9 OtherLoansi,t
+  10NetCOi,t + T imet + ✏i,t
We control for the lagged value of the allowance for loan losses (ALL) account and expect its
coe cient to be negative, because a larger ALL implies the bank has a greater level of reserves to
begin the year. An LLP expense is used to replenish the value of this account as losses materialize
and as loss expectations change; therefore, a higher beginning of year value implies less need to
increase reserves further.
There are also many controls used to capture important loan portfolio characteristics that
a↵ect the level of expected losses. We control for both the lagged value of non-performing loans
(NPL) as well as the change in non-performing loans ( NPL) during year t. The expected sign on
each is positive; however, we expect the coe cient for  NPL to be greater in magnitude, because
previously identified non-performing loans may not require additional reserves to the extent that
su cient reserves were made, and provision expenses incurred, in prior periods.
Further, we control for the lagged values of real estate loans (RE), commercial and industrial
loans (CI), and other loans (OtherLoans). Banks engaged in a greater level of lending activity are
likely to incur more loan related losses, so we expect positive coe cients on each of these controls.
Most prior studies have ignored loan segment variables when estimating the discretionary and
11Non-performing loans is computed as the sum of loans 90 days or more delinquent and still in accrual status,
plus any loans that have been placed in non-accrual status (items bhck5525 and bhck5526).
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non-discretionary components of LLP; however, failure to include them could result in an inac-
curate estimation of the LLP components since, for example, a residential real estate loan may
have a di↵erent expected loss than a business loan of equal value. As estimation procedures have
become more refined some studies have incorporated loan type variables (e.g., Cornett et al., 2009;
Kanagaretnam et al., 2010; DeBoskey and Jiang, 2012); however, in our estimation we go one step
further and also include variables reflecting changes in loan portfolio composition:  RE,  CI, and
 OtherLoans.
Additionally, we control for net charge-o↵s (NetCO), which is the amount of bank loans charged-
o↵ in year t less any recoveries. This should have a strong positive relation to LLP, as the relation
is, to an extent, mechanical. A loan charge-o↵ reflects the materialization of a loan loss and
directly reduces the value of a bank’s allowance for loan losses (ALL). Consequently, high levels of
loan charge-o↵s result in the need to replenish the ALL account. While it is possible that some
discretion could also be utilized in regards to the timing of the charge-o↵ decision, failing to control
for charge-o↵s would confound our measure of DLLP, as banks that experience higher realizations
of loan defaults would be likely to have higher DLLP values. Additionally, the degree of discretion
in the charge-o↵ decision is less substantial, and if anything, controlling for it should produce more
conservative estimates.
Lastly, we include year indicator variables to control for the impact of changes in the regulatory
environment, overall economic conditions, and other time specific factors. This also accounts for
the average economic expectations among managers, which can influence their estimates of future
losses.12
Although we do not include them as predictors in our main specification, we also explore
the impact of controlling for earnings before taxes and LLP expenses (EBTP) in year t and the
lagged level of bank Tier 1 capital (Tier1). There is some debate in the literature on whether
the e↵ect of these terms on bank LLP reflects managerial discretion or relevant underlying loan
portfolio characteristics.13 Most studies have interpreted a positive coe cient on EBTP and Tier1
as evidence of earnings management and capital management, respectively. For instance, a positive
12The inclusion of year fixed e↵ects precludes adding our proxies for overall economic conditions as control variables,
as this would result in multicollinearity issues.
13Among many others, Kim and Kross (1998), Ahmed et al. (1999), Fonseca and Gonza´lez (2008), Cornett et al.
(2009), DeBoskey and Jiang (2012), and Dolar (2016) explore the use of DLLP to achieve managerial objectives and
provide mixed evidence.
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coe cient on EBTP is consistent with banks recording more LLP expenses in years when their
earnings are high because they can greater a↵ord to, and banks under-reporting LLP expenses
when their earnings are low in order to boost reported income, thus, e↵ectively smoothing income
over time. Likewise banks may be more willing to record LLP expenses when they have su ciently
high amounts of Tier 1 capital but become more hesitant as capital is depleted.14 This is the
position we adopt here, and we interpret positive coe cients on these variables as evidence of the
aforementioned managerial biases. Additionally, there are many other reasons why management
may choose to record discretionary provision expenses, which we do not explicitly test for.
By omitting the EBTP and Tier1 variables from our main specification, we will e↵ectively
be capturing these discretionary influences in the error term of equation 1, which is our intent.
All other factors including plans to pursue aggressive loan growth strategies and other private
information not reflected in the financial statements will also be captured in the error term. That
is, we e↵ectively decompose LLP into two components as shown below in equations 1.2 and 1.3,
where the non-discretionary component of loan loss provisions (NDLLP) is the predicted value
of LLP from equation 1, and the discretionary component of loan loss provisions (DLLP) is the
di↵erence between actual loan loss provisions and predicted loan loss provisions.
NDLLP = dLLP (1.2)
DLLP = LLP   dLLP (1.3)
1.4.2 Testing the Conditional Market Valuation of DLLP
Having estimated the discretionary component of loan loss provisions, we can now test our
hypothesis that the information it conveys to the market is conditional on the state of the economy
(CVH). The prior literature has generally found DLLP to be associated with higher bank stock
returns; however, when the economy is struggling borrower defaults occur more frequently, and
loan losses represent a major concern. Thus, we expect that DLLP recorded in bad economic states
primarily reflect management’s inside information about a deteriorating loan portfolio leading to
a negative stock price response. Further, during economic downturns most financial institutions
14As noted earlier, this would not hold for the pre-BASEL period; however, our sample begins after the regulatory
changes that resulted in the allowance for loan losses being excluded from Tier 1 capital.
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tighten their credit standards, making it unlikely that extra provision expenses are recorded to
support more aggressive lending policies. To test our conditional valuation hypothesis, we estimate
the following regression:
EXRETi,t =  0 +  1DLLPi,t +  2LowGDPt ⇤DLLPi,t +  3NDLLPi,t (1.4)
+  4LowGDPt ⇤NDLLPi,t +  5EBTPi,t +  6Log(Size)i,t 1
+  7Log(BTM)i,t 1 +  8T ier1i,t 1 + T imet + ✏i,t.
We regress a BHC’s excess return in year t (EXRET) on DLLP, NDLLP, interactions of
LowGDP with each LLP component, and several controls for known determinants of stock re-
turns. Our primary coe cients of interest are  1 and  2. A positive value of the coe cient  1
supports our hypothesis that the markets value discretionary loss provisions positively when the
economy is strong and a subset banks record excess provisions to support their increased lending
e↵orts. However, we expect to find a negative value of the coe cient  2, implying that the positive
reaction only occurs during “good times”, and the market instead views extra loan loss provisions
as a source of negative information when the economy is struggling. We repeat this analysis by
interacting each of our four di↵erent proxies for economic conditions with DLLP and expect to find
consistent results in each instance.
The non-discretionary component of earnings, NDLLP, is expected to be negatively associated
with returns regardless of the state of the economy given that it represents higher losses directly
related to loan portfolio characteristics. Although it is unclear whether the magnitude of its coef-
ficient would di↵er during periods of strong versus weak growth, we interact this variable with the
LowGDP indicator as well to empirically test this possibility.
We also include year indicator variables in all specifications to alleviate the concern that the
results are driven by abnormally high or low bank stock returns in a particular year.15 Given that
we are studying firms from only one industry, the returns for most of our observations tend to be
relatively high or relatively low within a given year; therefore, year controls are used to capture the
market performance of the banking sector.
15We do not include the LowGDP indicator variable in the same specification, as it cannot be estimated due to
collinearity with the year indicator variables.
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1.4.3 E↵ect of the Financial Crisis on DLLP Valuation
The 2008 financial crisis represents a period of economic weakness when lending standards tight-
ened significantly and bank loan portfolios were highly distressed. Consequently, our hypotheses
suggest the market will value DLLP even more negatively during this period than in less severe
downturns, as loan loss provisions were expected to be recorded almost exclusively to cover losses
on existing problem loans. Additionally, there may be some concern that the financial crisis is
solely responsible for the conditional valuation e↵ect. In order to ensure this is not the case and to
test our hypothesis, we generate a dummy variable, CRISIS, which takes the value of one during
the holding periods ending in 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise. We add an additional interaction
term between this indicator variable and DLLP with the regression equation displayed below.
EXRETi,t =  0 +  1DLLPi,t +  2LowGDPt ⇤DLLPi,t +  3CRISISt ⇤DLLPi,t
+  4NDLLPi,t +  5LowGDPt ⇤NDLLPi,t +  6CRISISt ⇤DLLPi,t +  7EBTPi,t
+  8Log(Size)i,t 1 +  9Log(BTM)i,t 1 +  10T ier1i,t 1 + T imet + ✏i,t (1.5)
We expect to find a positive value for  1 as before; however, this specification allows us to test
if there is a di↵erential impact of how the market values DLLP when the economy is relatively
weak compared to when it is experiencing a severe recession. Given that the banking industry as a
whole tightens lending standards during periods of economic weakness, we expect negative values
for both  2 and  3. This is consistent with DLLP being more reflective of loan default problems
than plans to implement loan growth strategies when the economy is relatively weak and implies the
valuation e↵ect is even more negative during the crisis when loan defaults became a major concern.
Alternatively, if the crisis period is completely driving the conditional valuation of DLLP, then the
significance of  2 will be subsumed by the crisis interaction term and only  3 will be significantly
negative, suggesting that DLLP is positively valued aside from times of severe financial crisis.
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1.5 Results
1.5.1 Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions (DLLP) Estimation
In this section, we begin by estimating the discretionary and non-discretionary components of
loan loss provisions to test our conditional valuation hypothesis. Table 1.2 presents the results from
regressions of bank loan loss provisions on a set of control variables used to determine a bank’s
expected loan losses. We focus primarily on the results of our baseline model from equation 1.1,
which are reported in the first column.
As expected, the allowance for loan losses (ALL) has a significantly negative e↵ect on LLP
expenses. For each additional dollar of loss reserves in the ALL at the end of the prior year,
approximately 24.7 fewer cents are expected to be expensed. This is unsurprising because, all else
equal, a higher ALL balance implies the bank has greater reserves already built up to absorb future
losses. Further, we find a significantly positive coe cient on each of our loan type variables, and the
coe cients are significantly di↵erent from one another reflecting the varying risk levels associated
with di↵erent loan types. For instance, the coe cient on CI is 0.742, which is greater than the
coe cient on RE or OtherLoans, reflecting the higher risk associated with commercial lending.
Net charge-o↵s (NetCO) enters with a coe cient of 106.65 suggesting that for every $1 of
loans charged-o↵, approximately $1.07 is expensed. In other words, banks contribute roughly one
additional dollar to the allowance for loan losses account for each dollar of loans deemed uncollectible
to replenish its value. The fact that our coe cient exceeds one may be a reflection of the use of
historical loss ratios by banks to estimate future losses; thus, resulting in higher reserves following
periods of elevated losses.
Finally, we include year indicator variables in our baseline specification to capture industry-
wide, time-varying e↵ects. Although unreported, many year indicators are significant, with 2008
and 2009 having the most positive coe cients. This is a product of the heightened loan losses
during the financial crisis resulting in the need for substantial provision expenses. Column 2 is the
only specification where we omit year controls. We find the R-squared value declines and many of
the coe cients change noticeably when omitting these as right-hand side variables suggesting it is
important to control for time e↵ects.
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In columns 3 through 5, we add controls for either earnings before taxes and provision expenses
(EBTP), the level of Tier 1 capital, or both. In column 3, EBTP enters with a positive but
statistically insignificant coe cient, and in column 4 Tier1 has a positive and significant coe cient.
This implies the extent to which most banks used DLLP to engage in income smoothing in our
sample period was somewhat limited but is consistent with prior findings of capital management.
In column 5, we include both EBTP and Tier1 and find the coe cient on EBTP becomes negative,
albeit insignificant, while Tier1 is still positive and significant at the five percent level. This suggests
the management of bank capital levels is one additional factor that may cause banks to bias their
loan loss estimates; however, it does not generate predictions consistent with our hypotheses, as its
e↵ect on valuation should be similar in all states of the economy.
It is worth mentioning that our main specification in column 1, which will be used for the
remainder of the analyses, has a very high R-squared value of 0.893. This is substantially higher
than what is typical in prior literature predicting the level of LLP.16 While much of this may be
due to the use of a broader sample with more variation as well as di↵erences in sample periods, we
have also included many important predictors in estimating the levels of DLLP and NDLLP that
were often omitted in earlier studies. This is crucial because failure to accurately partition LLP will
limit the power and reliability of our tests. The fact that we can explain the majority (89.3%) of
the variation is expected given that there are many observable loan portfolio quality indicators that
have a sizable impact on loan loss provisions. Going forward, the regression residuals are referred
to as DLLP, since they represent provision expenses unexplained by loan portfolio characteristics
reported in the financial statements, and the fitted values from our regression are referred to as
NDLLP. We also winsorsize the DLLP variable at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles to mitigate the
e↵ect of outliers.17
In addition, the results from Table 1.2 reveal the inclusion of EBTP and Tier1 has a minimal
impact on the regression R-squared value, and when reported to three decimal places the R-squared
values are the same. This is consistent with the non-discretionary determinants of loan loss pro-
16For reference, Huizinga and Laeven (2012) report an R2 ranging from 0.357 to 0.515 but use quarterly LLP.
Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) obtain an adjusted R2 of 0.3659 while using a smaller sample of 837 bank-year observations
that is likely to exhibit much less variation. Ahmed et al. (1999) report an adjusted R2 ranging from 0.20 to 0.24
with annual data but fail to control for the level of net charge-o↵s and ALL, and they include a time regime dummy
rather than year dummies, all of which are found to be important predictors.
17We examine the results when winsorizing instead at the 1st and 99th or 5th and 95th percentiles and find the
results are robust.
22
visions explaining more of the overall variation than the discretionary components, although other
factors captured in the error term, such as management’s private information about its loan port-
folio and plans to alter credit standards, are expected to have a stronger impact than EBTP or
Tier1.
1.5.2 Conditional Valuation of DLLP
Having estimated both discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss provisions, we now explore
the valuation of DLLP and test our main hypothesis (CVH). We expect to find a strong conditional
valuation of DLLP, as the factors that drive managers’ decisions of whether to record extra loss
provisions depend highly on the state of the economy. Specifically, when overall economic activity is
increasing, managers have an incentive to loosen underwriting standards in order to grow their loan
portfolios and boost earnings as suggested by Ruckes (2004), which can produce a positive market
response given that expected defaults are low. However, when economic growth slows, banks lend
more conservatively, thereby reducing the risk associated with new loans being granted. At the same
time, the likelihood that existing borrowers default increases making it necessary for managers of
troubled institutions to record extra loss provisions to cover looming defaults, resulting in a negative
valuation of DLLP recorded in bad economic times. To test the CVH, we regress annual bank excess
returns on the value of each component of provision expenses, DLLP and NDLLP, an interaction
of each component with one of our four proxies for economic conditions, earnings before taxes and
provision expenses, EBTP, and other known determinants of stock returns. Table 1.3 presents the
results.
In Panel A, we test our hypothesis using the indicator for low real GDP growth as a proxy
for the overall state of the economy. The primary coe cients of interest are on DLLP and the
LowGDP-DLLP interaction term. As predicted, we find the estimate of DLLP’s impact on returns
is positive during periods of strong economic growth but negative during times when the economy
is weak. A Wald test on the sum of the  1 and  2 coe cients confirms the marginal e↵ect of DLLP
during periods of low growth is negative and significant at the one percent level, thus, highlighting
that investors perceived loan portfolio weakness as the primary driver of DLLP in bad states of the
economy.18
18We also repeat the analysis focusing separately on investor reactions to banks that over-reserve (positive DLLP)
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Panel B repeats the analysis using the industry median Tobin’s Q, measured as the average ratio
of market value of assets to book value of assets, as an alternate proxy for economic conditions.
We obtain results that are qualitatively similar to before with DLLP being positively valued during
good times, when average bank Q values are high, and negatively valued during bad times. The
coe cient on DLLP is positive and significant at the five percent level while the interaction term
is negative and significant at the one percent level.
In Panel C, we interact the recession indicator based on the NBER’s business cycle dates with
DLLP. As predicted, we find the estimate of DLLP’s impact on returns is positive during periods of
expansion but negative during recessions. It is worth noting, however, that the coe cient on DLLP
is small and statistically insignificant, which highlights the shortcomings of the recession indicator.
The REC variable succeeds in identifying the years of greatest economic concern, as evidenced
by the significantly negative coe cient on the REC-DLLP interaction, but classifies relatively few
years as o cial recessions even when the economy is relatively weak. This results in a much smaller
and insignificant coe cient on DLLP.
For our final proxy of economic conditions we use the consumer sentiment index with the results
presented in Panel D. Our findings are similar to before in terms of the signs of the coe cients,
and DLLP once again enters with a significantly positive coe cient. This suggests that in years
when the level of consumer sentiment was high, investors viewed banks with higher levels of DLLP
favorably, as these institutions were expected to increase their lending e↵orts more substantially.
Additionally, all of the control variables enter with the expected signs. The non-discretionary
component of loan loss provisions, NDLLP, has a negative and significant coe cient in all specifi-
cations as predicted given that this variable reflects the amount of distress in bank loan portfolios
based on financial statements. Further, its e↵ect does not seem to be greatly impacted by economic
conditions, as the coe cient on its interaction term is small in magnitude and only statistically
significant in Panels B and C. Our controls for earnings, size, book-to-market, and Tier 1 capital
are also significant at the one percent level, and in all panels we include year dummy variables.
Although unreported, many of the year controls enter significantly as well. Because individual
banks appear in our sample over multiple years, we cluster standard errors at the bank level, which
compared to those that under-reserve (negative DLLP) for future loan losses with the results reported in Appendix
Table A1.2. We find the general results are consistent in both cases, although the market reaction to positive DLLP
is stronger, consistent with banks having greater leeway to over-reserve than under-reserve.
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addresses the concern that regression residuals may be correlated across time for the same bank
holding company.
1.5.3 DLLP and Future Bank Performance
There is much theoretical and empirical evidence that bank lending standards vary dramatically
over the business cycle (Asea and Blomberg, 1998; Ruckes, 2004; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012; Bassett
et al., 2014). As a result, the factors that cause managers to record discretionary loan loss provisions
are expected to vary as well. We have already seen that investors value discretionary loan loss
provisions positively when economic growth is strong but negatively when economic growth is
weak, and we now test our second hypothesis that DLLP will be associated with higher future
earnings growth and lending activity in good states of the economy.
In Table 1.4, we partition our sample period based on whether the predictor variables, including
DLLP, are measured during years of above or below median real GDP growth. Next, we regress
various measures of future bank performance on current period values of DLLP, NDLLP, and a set
of control variables.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that during periods when the economy is strong, as
reflected in high real GDP growth, DLLP is associated with significantly higher earnings before
taxes and provision expenses in the following year. Further, when examining specific components
of earnings as the outcome variable, we observe that DLLP has a significantly positive relation
with next period net interest income (NII) but is not significantly related to non-interest income
(NonII) or non-interest expenses (NonIE). This adds support to the theory that these high DLLP
banks relax lending standards in order to obtain higher yielding loans, as the impact is manifested
in observable outcomes. Finally, in the last column we see that DLLP is positively related to future
loan growth, although the relation is only marginally significant. Overall, these results support
our hypothesis that when the economy is healthy and borrowers are less likely to default, bank
managers who set aside excess reserves do so to establish a cushion for potential losses as they
pursue loan growth strategies that include higher interest rate loans. Therefore, the extra provision
expenses serve as an indication of the bank’s increased future earnings potential.
Conversely, when economic growth is low we find no relation between DLLP and future earnings
or loan growth. The coe cient on DLLP is insignificant at the five percent level in all of the
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predictive regressions and is significantly negative in predicting net interest income at the ten
percent level. This suggests that during bad economic times DLLP o↵ers few predictions for the
future performance of the bank, and as a result simply represents additional expenses taken in the
current period to cover loan losses.
1.5.4 Impact of the Financial Crisis
Table 1.5 explores the valuation of DLLP during the 2008 financial crisis, which was a time of
extreme financial distress for a large number of banks. Consistent with prior results, DLLP enters
with a positive coe cient that is significant at the one percent level in all specifications. Inter-
estingly, the interaction of DLLP and LowGDP still enters with a significantly negative coe cient
even after the inclusion of the CRISIS-DLLP interaction term. Thus, we find that even during
times of relative – but not extreme – economic weakness, DLLP is not valued positively by the
market. In fact, the estimated marginal e↵ect ( 1 +  2) of discretionary loan loss provisions on
returns is negative and significant at the ten percent level.
We also find there was a significant incremental e↵ect of the financial crisis on the market’s
valuation of DLLP, as the overall e↵ect of DLLP on returns became much more negative during
this period. This is reflective of the fact that growing investor fears over underlying loan portfolio
quality were the dominant force at the time. The estimated marginal e↵ect ( 1 +  2 +  3) of
discretionary loan loss provisions on returns during the crisis is negative and significant at the one
percent level.
1.6 Robustness
This section presents a series of robustness tests to help rule out alternate explanations. Specif-
ically, we explore the valuation of DLLP over various sub periods and around significant economic
events during the financial crisis. We also form a matched sample of high and low DLLP banks to
help minimize any remaining endogeneity concerns.
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1.6.1 Subperiod Analysis
To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by a specific period of time and to shed
more light on our analysis, we conduct regressions that decompose our sample into five separate
subperiods with the results presented in Table 1.6. We find the market reaction to DLLP is positive
during periods of expansion and strong growth such as the late 1990s and mid 2000s. The last row
reports the average growth rate of real GDP, which was much higher during these two sub periods;
thus, highlighting the strength of the economy in these times. During the subsample spanning 2000
to 2002, the coe cient on DLLP is negative but also small and only marginally significant. This
period includes the recession following the dot-com boom; however, the recession was relatively
short-lived, o cially lasting only eight months, and consumer optimism was still near average
levels. In contrast, the financial crisis was much more severe and coincided with a major decline
in economic output, consumer confidence, and credit availability. The market reaction to DLLP
during this period was extremely negative and significant at the one percent level, consistent with
the market perceiving higher than expected loan loss provisions as being driven by problems in
bank loan portfolios. We also find a negative but less extreme reaction to DLLP in the period
following the financial crisis, as economic concerns dissipated slowly.
Most prior studies on DLLP valuation explore periods prior to 2006, and our results are in
agreement with the general finding of a positive market valuation during that time. This is con-
sistent with our explanation, as economic growth was strong during most of the 1990s through the
mid-2000s. Overall, the findings of this table support the notion of a strong conditional market
valuation dependent upon the health of the economy.
1.6.2 Major Events of the Financial Crisis
To add to the evidence of the conditional valuation of DLLP, we exploit two plausibly exogenous
events that occurred during the 2008 financial crisis. We first sort banks into quintile portfolios
based on their value of DLLP, and we define the portfolio DLLPQ5, which includes banks in the
top quintile and DLLPQ1, which includes banks in the bottom quintile. We then study the returns
of each portfolio relative to the S&P 500 index around major events that are expected to alter the
level of concern regarding loan defaults and consumer confidence in the banking sector. In each
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case we use a return measurement window spanning from one trading day before the event to one
day after the event. Table 1.7 displays the results.
Panel A presents returns around the seizure of IndyMac Bank by federal regulators on July
11, 2008, which was driven to a large extent by a substantial increase in mortgage defaults and
represented one of the largest bank failures in U.S. history. Although this event sent a shock through
the entire banking sector, it is observed that high DLLP bank stock prices su↵ered much more,
falling by 4.79% relative to the S&P 500 index compared to just 2.04% for low DLLP banks. This
di↵erence is significant at the five percent level, and is consistent with our evidence that investor
fears over loan defaults result in a negative valuation of DLLP when the economy is struggling.19
Panel B explores returns around the announcement of the proposal for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) by then Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, on September 19, 2008. Although
the program details were not yet known at this time, the intent to increase the liquidity of the
secondary mortgage market and provide major relief to distressed financial institutions was clearly
communicated. We observe that this had a major impact on bank valuations, but that stock prices
for high DLLP banks increased significantly more as their average return relative to the S&P 500
was 11.91% compared to 5.38% for low DLLP banks. This suggests the market anticipated that
banks with high DLLP would benefit more substantially from the bailout and that the program
would help lessen the negative impact of bad assets on their financial statements.
1.6.3 Matched Sample Analysis
To provide assurance that bank di↵erences in DLLP are driving the results, as opposed to bank
di↵erences along some other dimension, we conduct a matched sample analysis with the results
presented in Table 1.8. To form our sample, we first take banks in the top quintile of DLLP each
year based on the indicator DLLPQ5. We then match each high DLLP bank to the bank with
the most similar characteristics within the same year that does not record a high level of DLLP.
Specifically, we match banks using nearest neighbor matching based on their computed mahalanobis
distance, which takes into account how large the di↵erences are in their characteristic values for
NDLLP, EBTP, log size, log book-to-market, and tier 1 capital.
19In unreported results, we also find similar return patterns around the date Washington Mutual was seized and
placed into receivership in September 2008, although significance levels are somewhat lower.
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Panel A presents mean characteristic values for high DLLP banks as well as for all other banks
prior to creating a matched sample. The values are presented separately for years when real GDP
growth is low (LowGDP = 1) and high (LowGDP = 0), since our goal is to measure the market
reaction to DLLP separately during these periods. We find that many significant di↵erences exist
between the two groups of banks as indicated by the reported p-values from tests for di↵erences in
means.
Panel B reports the average characteristic values for the high DLLP banks and their correspond-
ing matches. Here we observe that the matching procedure is e↵ective at minimizing characteristic
di↵erences, as the two groups no longer exhibit a significant di↵erence along any of the key vari-
ables in periods of high or low GDP growth. This allows for a cleaner evaluation of the valuation
of DLLP.
The measured e↵ect of recording high levels of discretionary loan loss provisions is reported
in Panel C. We find that during good economic times, banks with high levels of DLLP earn an
annual return that is, on average, 5.58% higher than other similar banks with lower levels of DLLP.
Conversely, during bad times high DLLP banks earn an annual return that is, on average, 5.49%
lower than comparable banks with lower DLLP. Both estimates are statistically significant at the
one percent level. This helps confirm that much information is contained in the loan loss estimates
provided by banking institutions, and that economic conditions play a large role in whether investors
are likely to view DLLP positively or as a major cause for concern. In unreported tests, we find the
results are robust to the use of alternate matching mechanisms including propensity score matching.
1.7 Conclusions
Prior research has generally found that the market values discretionary loan loss provisions
positively but has failed to reach a conclusion for what drives this finding and has relied on relatively
limited sample periods. Motivated by evidence of substantial variation in lending standards over the
course of the business cycle, this study explores the e↵ect of economic conditions on the valuation of
discretionary loan loss provisions and documents a strong conditional valuation e↵ect. In particular,
we show that discretionary loan loss provisions are positively valued during years of strong economic
growth when banks tend to loosen underwriting standards, whereas the market reacts negatively
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to DLLP recorded during economic downturns when credit policies become more restrictive. This
result is robust to the choice of proxy for economic conditions and also holds when examining a
matched sample in which banks only exhibit significant di↵erences in their levels of DLLP.
Intuitively, during periods of economic growth banks tend to relax lending standards in order to
increase loan volume and generate higher interest income. Bank managers who plan to implement
such growth strategies can use DLLP in order to build up reserves that protect against the increased
credit risk. In this case, the extra provision expenses serve as an indication to investors of the
bank’s increased future earning potential and defaults are expected to remain low given the health
of the economy. However, when earnings are depressed and more borrowers are likely to experience
financial hardship, DLLP is no longer valued positively as banks tighten their lending standards
and are only expected to record extra provision expenses when many existing problem loans are
nearing default. This results in a significantly negative valuation of DLLP recorded during bad
states of the economy.
In addition, we find that not only did market participants respond negatively to discretionary
loan loss provisions during periods of low economic growth; they also did so much more severely
during the financial crisis. This is consistent with our main hypothesis, as it became increasingly
clear that DLLP recorded during this period was reflective of management’s private information
about distress within its loan portfolio. This also suggests that bank regulators, in particular, have
reason to evaluate loan loss provisions with more scrutiny during bad times, as this is when banks
are able to benefit most by overstating their true financial health.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
The sample contains 6,046 bank-year observations and 767 unique bank holding companies (BHCs)
over the period 1997–2013. This table reports the mean, median, standard deviation, 1st percentile,
5th percentile, 95th percentile, and 99th percentile values for each variable used in the regression
analysis within our study. Panel A reports statistics for the accounting variables. LLP is equal
to a BHC’s provision for loan loss expense in year t multiplied by 100 and scaled by total assets
at the end of year t 1. Similarly, we scale all accounting variables by prior year-end total assets.
EBTP is earnings before taxes and provision for loan loss expense. Tier1 is the lagged value of
bank Tier 1 capital. ALL is the lagged value of the allowance for loan losses account. NPL is the
lagged value of non-performing loans comprised of loans 90 days or more delinquent and any loans
that are in nonaccrual status. RE, CI, and OtherLoans are measured as lagged total real estate,
commercial and industrial loans, and other loans, respectively.  RE,  CI, and  OtherLoans
represent first di↵erences between years t and t-1 for real estate, commercial and industrial, and
other loans, respectively. NetCO is the amount of net charge-o↵s computed as total charge-o↵s
minus recoveries. Panel B reports statistics on stock market data. EXRET is a BHC’s annual stock
return in excess of the one-year risk-free rate. Log(Size) is the natural log of a bank’s market value
of equity computed as the price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Log(BTM) is the
log of the book value of assets divided by the market value of assets.
Panel A: Accounting Data
Mean Median Stdev P1 P5 P95 P99
LLP 0.4642 0.2465 0.7029 -0.1437 0.0000 1.7258 3.7159
EBTP 0.0185 0.0182 0.0155 -0.0169 0.0032 0.0329 0.0505
Tier1 0.0906 0.0857 0.0383 0.0506 0.0606 0.1276 0.1869
ALL 0.0099 0.0091 0.0049 0.0008 0.0044 0.0189 0.0283
NPL 0.0092 0.0050 0.0122 0.0000 0.0005 0.0328 0.0592
 NPL 0.0014 0.0002 0.0098 -0.0204 -0.0086 0.0144 0.0383
RE 0.4686 0.4793 0.1570 0.0045 0.1999 0.7078 0.8039
 RE 0.0618 0.0386 0.1172 -0.1168 -0.0500 0.2438 0.4838
CI 0.1099 0.0945 0.0747 0.0003 0.0177 0.2500 0.3797
 CI 0.0125 0.0065 0.0356 -0.0548 -0.0234 0.0649 0.1390
OtherLoans 0.0794 0.0581 0.0776 0.0004 0.0049 0.2024 0.3336
 OtherLoans 0.0058 0.0012 0.0267 -0.0499 -0.0194 0.0428 0.1053
NetCO 0.0038 0.0018 0.0061 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0155 0.0313
Panel B: Market Data
Mean Median Stdev P1 P5 P95 P99
EXRET 0.0823 0.0620 0.3655 -0.7639 -0.4797 0.6941 1.1019
Log(Size) 12.4755 12.0899 1.8243 9.6516 10.2220 16.3168 18.0689
Log(BTM) -0.0569 -0.0466 0.0937 -0.2646 -0.1729 0.0390 0.0640
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Table 1.2: Estimation of Bank Loan Loss Provisions
This table presents regressions of annual BHC loan loss provisions (LLP) on a set of predictor
variables that a↵ect the level of loan losses. The dependent variable in each specification is LLP,
which is calculated as the dollar amount of bank loan loss provisions in year t, scaled by bank total
assets at year-end t   1. We multiply this coe cient by 100 to transform it to a percentage, and
enhance the readability of the coe cients. Independent variables are all scaled by lagged assets
and include earnings before taxes and provision expenses (EBTP), Bank Tier 1 Capital (Tier1),
allowance for loan losses (ALL), non-performing loans (NPL), the change in non-performing loans
( NPL), total real estate loans (RE), the change in real estate loans ( RE), total commercial and
industrial loans (CI), the change in commercial and industrial loans ( CI), loans other than RE
and CI (OtherLoans), the change in other loans ( OtherLoans), and net charge-o↵s measured as
the di↵erence between annual charge-o↵s and recoveries (NetCO). Columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 include
year dummy variables to control for variation in LLP due to the economic conditions in di↵erent
time periods. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, with the corresponding t-statistics
reported below in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EBTP 0.221 -0.153
(0.91) (-0.41)
Tier1 0.224*** 0.256**
(2.96) (2.10)
ALL -24.665*** -26.898*** -24.726*** -24.797*** -24.773***
(-10.25) (-11.19) (-10.33) (-10.32) (-10.35)
NPL 1.860*** 1.521** 1.902*** 1.892*** 1.867***
(2.63) (2.27) (2.69) (2.68) (2.66)
 NPL 12.316*** 13.715*** 12.315*** 12.300*** 12.299***
(9.03) (10.33) (9.02) (9.03) (9.03)
RE 0.417*** 0.442*** 0.421*** 0.423*** 0.421***
(12.32) (13.34) (12.31) (12.35) (12.24)
 RE 0.154** 0.146** 0.152** 0.152** 0.153**
(2.07) (2.07) (2.03) (2.03) (2.03)
CI 0.742*** 0.813*** 0.745*** 0.754*** 0.754***
(10.11) (10.76) (10.18) (10.24) (10.24)
 CI 0.095 0.006 0.090 0.092 0.095
(0.43) (0.03) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43)
OtherLoans 0.211*** 0.253*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.209**
(3.22) (3.93) (3.23) (3.21) (3.28)
 OtherLoans 0.094 0.041 0.086 0.084 0.088
(0.52) (0.23) (0.48) (0.46) (0.49)
NetCO 106.652*** 109.646*** 106.678*** 106.730*** 106.724***
(62.26) (65.35) (62.35) (62.44) (62.47)
Year Controls Y N Y Y Y
R-squared 0.893 0.888 0.893 0.893 0.893
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Table 1.6: Sub-period Analysis of DLLP Valuation
This table presents regressions for the five di↵erent sub-periods listed in the first row of the table.
The dependent variable in each specification is the annual bank stock return in excess of the one-year
risk-free rate (EXRET). All columns include year dummy variables, and t-statistics are reported
below in parentheses. Real GDP Growth represents the average annual growth rate across the years
in the subperiod. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
PERIOD 1997  1999 2000  2002 2003  2005 2006  2008 2009  2013
EXRET EXRET EXRET EXRET EXRET
DLLP 0.126** -0.092* 0.181*** -0.268*** -0.081**
(2.36) (-1.72) (4.12) (-7.29) (-2.01)
NDLLP -0.129*** -0.159*** -0.099*** -0.155*** -0.101***
(-6.16) (-6.95) (-4.21) (-15.21) (-10.14)
EBTP 6.767*** 7.488*** 6.245*** 3.284*** 10.383***
(6.76) (9.89) (9.33) (6.01) (13.87)
Log(Size) 0.004 -0.017*** -0.004 0.002 -0.004
(1.01) (-3.69) (-1.18) (0.55) (-0.89)
Log(BTM) 0.764*** 0.965*** 0.891*** 0.283** 2.298***
(5.30) (8.99) (7.42) (2.25) (12.09)
Year Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,087 1,179 1,237 1,015 1,528
Real GDP Growth 4.69 1.71 3.50 0.50 1.58
Table 1.7: Shocks to Consumer Confidence
This table evaluates the di↵erence in performance around significant economic events between banks
with high and low levels of discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP). Specifically, we compare the
performance of banks in the top quintile of DLLP (DLLPQ5) to banks in the bottom quintile
of DLLP (DLLPQ1) around both the date that IndyMac bank was seized by the FDIC, and
the date initial plans for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) were announced. Return
represents the cumulative bank return from 1 day before the announcement date until 1 day after
the announcement date relative to the corresponding return for the S&P 500 index. Obs represents
the number of banks in each portfolio. Also reported is the di↵erence in average returns for the two
portfolios with corresponding t-statistics and p-values for two-sided tests that evaluate whether the
mean returns are equal.
Panel A: IndyMac Bank Seized by FDIC (7/11/08)
Portfolio Return Obs Di↵ t p
DLLPQ5 -4.79 65 -2.74 -2.35 0.02
DLLPQ1 -2.04 65
Panel B: Announcement of TARP Proposal (9/19/08)
Portfolio Return Obs Di↵ t p
DLLPQ5 11.91 65 6.52 2.22 0.03
DLLPQ1 5.38 65
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Figure 1.1
Index of Consumer Sentiment and NBER Business Cycle Dates.
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The chart displays the Consumer Sentiment Index over time since its inception. The graph is
constructed using monthly values from January 1978 through April 2014. The shaded regions
correspond to the periods defined as recessions by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee.
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Appendix
Table A1.1
Variable names and descriptions.
Name Description
LLP Provision for Loan Losses (BHCK4230) multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged
total assets (BHCK2170).
EBTP Earnings before taxes and provisions (BHCK4300 + BHCK4230 + BHCK4302)
scaled by lagged total assets (BHCK2170).
Tier1 Tier 1 (BHCK8274) capital scaled by total assets (BHCK2170).
ALL Allowance for Loan Losses (BHCK3123) scaled by total assets (BHCK2170).
NPL Loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing (BHCK5525) plus loans in
nonaccrual status (BHCK5526) scaled by total assets (BHCK2170).
RE Loans secured by real estate (BHCK1410) scaled by total assets (BHCK2170).
CI Commercial and industrial loans (BHCK1763 + BHCK1764) scaled by total assets
(BHCK2170).
OtherLoans Total loans excluding real estate and C&I loans (BHCK 2122 - BHCK1410 -
BHCK1763 - BHCK1764) scaled by total assets (BHCK2170).
NetCO Charge-o↵s (BHCK4635) minus recoveries (BHCK4605) scaled by total assets
(BHCK2170).
DLLP Residual value from a regression model used in explaining loan loss provisions.
NDLLP Fitted value from a regression model used in explaining loan loss provisions.
EXRET Annual return from May 1st to April 30th less the annual return from investing in
1-month Treasury bills.
Size Stock price (prc) multiplied by the number of shares outstanding (shrout).
BTM Book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity.
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Chapter 2
Distressed, Expanding, and Overvalued: Evidence that
External Financing Activity Explains the Distress Anomaly
41
2.1 Introduction
A fundamental principle of finance is that investors require compensation for bearing risk. The
stocks of distressed (i.e. high failure-risk) firms, however, have earned significantly lower returns
over the years than stocks of healthy (i.e. low failure-risk) firms. This anomalous finding has posed
challenges for asset pricing models and led to a substantial body of research (e.g., Dichev, 1998;
Campbell et al., 2008; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Garlappi and Yan, 2011; Conrad et al.,
2014; Friewald et al., 2014; Hackbarth et al., 2015). In this study, I address this long-standing
puzzle and show the distress anomaly only exists among firms with high external financing activity
in the prior year. Within this subsample of firms, consisting of only twenty percent of the overall
sample, the underperformance of distressed stocks is extreme and persistent. What is perhaps even
more surprising is that the distress anomaly appears to be non-existent in the remaining eighty
percent of stocks.
I identify an external financing channel capable of generating significant overvaluation among
distressed stocks and explaining their subsequent underperformance. While the existing external
financing literature documents a strong negative relation between external financing activity and
future returns (Ritter, 1991; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Spiess and A✏eck-
Graves, 1999; Hertzel and Li, 2010), there are two key factors I predict will make the external
financing e↵ect stronger among distressed stocks and able to explain the distress anomaly: dis-
persion of investor valuations and short-sale impediments. Although neither factor individually is
su cient to influence asset prices, the presence of both has been shown to be associated with over-
valuation (Miller, 1977; D’Avolio, 2002; Boehme et al., 2006; Berkman et al., 2009; Daniel et al.,
2016). Specifically, when short-sale limitations prevent pessimists from taking a position in a given
security, its price will be determined solely by the most optimistic investors whose valuations are
increasing in the dispersion of valuation beliefs.
To understand the greater strength of these two factors for distressed stocks, first consider that
the decision by a distressed firm to raise external capital greatly impacts its value and long-run
viability but is also associated with substantial uncertainty. On the one hand, a large cash infusion
results in the firm being less cash constrained and allows it to undertake new projects that could be
highly profitable. On the other hand, raising external capital is expensive for risky distressed firms
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and can lead to the erosion of existing shareholder wealth if new capital projects do not pay o↵.
This uncertainty leads to a wider dispersion in investor beliefs. In addition, Campbell et al. (2008,
hereafter CHS) show that distressed companies tend to have smaller market capitalizations and
more volatile stock prices, which suggests they are also more challenging to sell short. I explore
additional firm characteristics that have been directly linked to short-sale limitations and find
that far greater impediments to short-selling exist among distressed stocks. Specifically, I show
distressed stocks have both high idiosyncratic volatility and low institutional ownership (D’Avolio,
2002; Nagel, 2005; Ponti↵, 2006; Stambaugh et al., 2015). Thus, the availability of borrowable
shares of distressed stocks is typically more limited given the lack of institutional holdings, and
even when shares are available, the significant arbitrage risk posed by their high idiosyncratic
volatility may deter short-selling. Consequently, as the dispersion of investor opinions increases
distressed stock prices are expected to increase as well resulting in overvaluation.
An anecdotal example highlighting the challenges associated with valuing quickly growing dis-
tressed firms as well as the important role played by external financing is seen in the case of Intercept
Pharmaceuticals. This biopharmaceutical firm which develops products designed for treating cer-
tain liver and intestinal diseases states in its 2013 annual report that, “we will continue to require
additional capital to continue our clinical development and commercialization activities. Because
successful development of our product candidates is uncertain, we are unable to estimate the ac-
tual funds we will require to complete research and development and commercialize our products
under development.” This company required significant external capital in order to undertake its
projects with highly uncertain payo↵s. If its products passed clinical testing and went to market,
shareholders could expect to receive a large payo↵; however, if its products failed, the firm would
be likely to remain unprofitable and experience a decline in stock price. While a pharmaceutical
company in the product development stages may seem like an extreme case, the high degree of
uncertainty and wide range of potential outcomes is typical of many highly distressed companies
and is expected to result in overvaluation in the presence of short-selling impediments.
The most closely related study from the external financing literature is Bradshaw et al. (2006),
which develops a measure of net external financing that is associated with negative future abnormal
returns and suggests the relation is driven by overly optimistic earnings expectations. While it
seems surprising that the market would systematically overvalue high external financing activity
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firms, the dispersion of opinion hypothesis predicts that due to the short-sale constraints associated
with distressed stocks, it is only necessary for some market participants to have overly optimistic
expectations to generate mispricing, rather than market participants as a whole. This more easily
satisfied condition is produced whenever there is an increase in the dispersion of investor beliefs.
To test how the external financing e↵ect varies with the level of distress, I double-sort firms into
portfolios based on their CHS distress risk and external financing measures. Consistent with the
theoretical predictions, I find a zero net-investment portfolio that buys healthy stocks and shorts
distressed stocks earns a highly significant return of 1.97% per month within the top external
financing quintile of firms.20 In contrast, similarly constructed portfolios designed to measure the
strength of the distress anomaly are much less profitable among the remaining stocks and earn a
negative average return within the bottom two external financing quintiles.
I subsequently conduct factor model regressions using several common asset pricing models to
see if previously identified risk factors can explain the underperformance of the high distress, high
external portfolio. While the Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) q-factor model appears to have the
most success in accounting for the lower returns to distressed stocks overall, it leaves large pricing
errors among the portfolio of high distress, high external financing firms. Within the top external
financing quintile, the distress-based long-short portfolio earns a highly significant alpha of 1.22%
per month, which is driven entirely by the short leg. Conversely, within the four remaining quintiles
long-short portfolio abnormal returns are small and insignificant. Overall, this evidence supports
the hypothesis that high distress, high external financing firms are overvalued.
Cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions present a similar picture. Predictive regres-
sions that control for only size, book-to-market, momentum, and distress indicate that distress has
a large negative impact, as is documented in prior research. However, upon the inclusion of the
external financing variable and a distress, external financing interaction term, the distress variable’s
coe cient is reduced substantially and becomes insignificant. This suggests that by itself distress
is not a strong predictor of future underperformance; rather, it serves to amplify the external fi-
nancing e↵ect by creating a greater divergence in beliefs among firms that are challenging to sell
short.
20The long-short portfolio return is also likely to serve as an upper bound on the return that a distress-based trading
strategy would generate, since short-selling limitations are expected to be severe. However, long-only investors could
still benefit by avoiding underperforming stocks.
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Because the divergence of opinion hypothesis implies that high distress, high external financing
stocks will be owned by the most optimistic investors, it is expected that shareholders will be disap-
pointed on average upon observing future performance outcomes, which should be more consistent
with the average expectation of all market participants. I test this implication by examining the
performance of the double-sorted portfolios around earnings announcement dates and find that a
substantial portion of the underperformance of the high distress, high external portfolio is concen-
trated during these high information periods. Although it is challenging to completely rule out
the possibility that unidentified risk factors can explain the results, it is unlikely that a risk-based
explanation could also account for such large negative reactions to earnings news.
The dispersion of opinion theory originally developed in Miller (1977) suggests that both high
dispersion of opinion and short-sale limitations are needed to generate overpricing, and the degree
of overpricing will be increasing in the severity of these two conditions. Thus, while I expect
distressed firms with high external financing will be overvalued in general, the extent of mispricing
should be even larger for firms that are especially di cult to value or challenging to sell short.
I test this by exploring the returns to distress-based long-short portfolios within subsets of high
external financing firms that have low analyst coverage and a shorter time since going public (i.e.
harder to value) as well as firms with high idiosyncratic volatility and low institutional ownership
(i.e. greater short-sale limitations). Consistent with overvaluation being greater among these firms,
the long-short portfolios earn higher returns within each of these subsets.
Many prior studies have attempted to explain the distress puzzle by incorporating previously
unaccounted for sources of risk or information. For example, Chava and Purnanandam (2010),
Garlappi and Yan (2011), and Friewald et al. (2014), propose models that focus on implied cost of
capital, shareholder recovery, and credit risk premia implied by CDS spreads, respectively. While
these studies have produced interesting new insights, they have tended to focus on proxies of firm
distress other than the CHS measure, which is shown to have greater ability to predict firm failure
and to produce much larger return spreads when conducting portfolio sorts. Additionally, data
limitations on CDS spreads and the variables needed to estimate implied cost of capital greatly
restrict the sample of distressed firms when utilizing either of these metrics. In this study, I use the
CHS measure of financial distress throughout the main analysis and find distress only has a strong
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negative relation to future stock performance when external financing is high.21 As robustness, I
show this finding holds over time, during periods of expansion and recession, and when extending
the portfolio holding period.
The main contributions to the existing literature can be summarized as follows. First, I identify
an external financing channel that can create significant overvaluation among distressed firms with
high recent external financing activity. I provide evidence that short-sale constraints are far greater
among distressed stocks, which allows their prices to be determined by the investors who are most
optimistic that new capital projects will pay o↵. Consistent with this, I find the anomalously
low returns to distressed stocks only exist among high external financing firms. Second, I show
the underperformance of the portfolio of high distress, high external financing firms is concentrated
around earnings announcements, which supports the notion that mispricing drives its low returns as
shareholders are negatively surprised by earnings news. Finally, I explore the results within subsets
of high external financing firms that possess characteristics making them particularly challenging
to value or subject to greater short-sale limitations and find even greater underperformance among
these subgroups of firms. This adds support to the dispersion of opinion hypothesis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the existing literature and
outlines the main hypotheses. Section 2.3 details the construction of the distress and external
financing variables and also provides an overview of the distress anomaly. Section 2.4 tests the
hypotheses and presents the empirical results. Section 2.5 discusses several robustness tests. Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
This section provides an overview of the literature on external financing activity and its impact
on asset pricing. Subsequently, I describe its relation to the distress anomaly and develop a set of
testable hypotheses.
21In unreported results, I test the predictions using Ohlson’s O-score as a proxy for distress as well as long-term
issuer credit rating and find qualitatively similar results.
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2.2.1 Background
The extensive literature on external financing produces one finding with surprising regularity
– a significant negative relation between capital raising events and future stock performance. The
most commonly o↵ered explanation for this finding is the market timing hypothesis, in which
managers take advantage of a “window of opportunity” by issuing securities when market prices
exceed fundamental values. Additionally, most studies within this strand of literature choose to
focus on a specific type of external financing. For instance, Ritter (1991) explores a sample of
initial public o↵erings (IPOs) and finds the stocks of IPO firms significantly underperform stocks
of comparable firms for three years after going public. He states that the evidence is consistent
with firms timing their decision to go public when investors are overly optimistic about their future
prospects, as the underperformance is concentrated among young growth companies and in years of
heavy IPO volume when favorable valuations are widespread. Loughran and Ritter (1995) document
a similar underperformance following seasoned equity o↵erings (SEOs). Consistent with the view
that managers tend to issue stock when they believe their securities are overpriced, Hertzel and
Li (2010) decompose market-to-book ratios into misvaluation and growth option components and
find the underperformance of SEOs is most severe for firms with a large misvaluation component.
Overall, their results suggest decisions to raise equity capital reflect firm overvaluation in addition
to financing needs.
While the majority of the external financing literature focuses on equity issuance, a number
of studies have also explored the relation between the decision to raise debt capital and future
performance. For example, Billett et al. (2006) show that although firms experience positive average
announcement stock returns upon obtaining bank loans, they also su↵er large negative abnormal
returns over the following three years. A similar pattern of small positive announcement returns
followed by severe long-run underperformance is documented in Chandra and Nayar (2008) for
private debt placements. They provide evidence that firms manage reported earnings upward prior
to the issuance of private debt using discretionary accruals, which results in temporary overvaluation
to the extent that investors fail to see through biased earnings figures. Finally, Spiess and A✏eck-
Graves (1999) report substantial long-run underperformance following both straight and convertible
debt o↵erings, and they suggest overvalued firms are more likely to o↵er securities of any type to
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take advantage of mispricing. In contrast to these studies, I focus on explaining why the external
financing e↵ect is expected to have a larger e↵ect on the performance of distressed stocks and why
overvaluation persists beyond security issuance announcement dates.
Given the expansive literature documenting negative abnormal returns following the issuance
of di↵erent security types, Bradshaw et al. (2006) develop a measure of net external financing,
which is the approach I use here. This measure aggregates total funds raised net of dividends,
repurchases, and funds used to pay down debt and is found to be a stronger predictor of future
underperformance than individual components of external financing. Bradshaw et al. also find that
large increases in external financing are associated with lower future profitability suggesting that
the returns to new projects often do not outweigh the cost of capital. This should be of particular
concern to investors in distressed companies given their higher external financing costs; however,
negative abnormal returns following issuance events imply prices do not adequately reflect this
possibility. The following section explains why investors may consistently overpay for high external
financing firms and why the degree of overpricing is expected to be far greater among distressed
stocks.
2.2.2 Hypothesis Development
The timing hypothesis asserts that firms issue securities when they are overvalued according to
management’s public and private information. While timing factors could explain why the issuance
of debt and equity securities tends to coincide with overvaluation, several important questions
are left unanswered. Specifically, why do low returns following issuance events persist for a year or
more rather than security prices fully adjusting at the time of announcement? Why do sophisticated
investors not fully exploit these opportunities given the severity of the average underperformance?
Are external financing e↵ects more pronounced for distressed companies because of their high costs
of external capital and large degree of uncertainty? If so, do external financing e↵ects explain the
distress anomaly?
This section develops a set of hypotheses aimed at answering these questions by building on
the theoretical predictions o↵ered initially in Miller (1977) and explored further in various settings
(Diether et al., 2002; Boehme et al., 2006; Berkman et al., 2009; Lam and Wei, 2011; Daniel et al.,
2016). The central concept is that in the presence of market imperfections that limit or restrict
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short selling, stocks with a greater divergence of investor valuation opinions will trade at a higher
price. This price is above the mean valuation of all market participants, as the market price is
e↵ectively determined by what the most optimistic investors are willing to pay while pessimistic
investors are prevented from trading against them. Individuals who hold lower valuations than
the market price simply do not take a position in the stock given the high costs and limitations
associated with short-selling.
In the case of distressed firms with significant external financing activity both the dispersion
of opinions and short-sale constraints are generally substantial. First, consider that for all firms,
healthy or distressed, the decision to raise external capital is expected to create an increased
dispersion of opinions among investors given the uncertainty associated with new projects and rapid
growth. Consistent with this, Chandra and Schneible (2013) document increased abnormal trading
activity, a common proxy for di↵ering investor opinions, for up to three years following external
financing events, which is increasing in the amount of capital raised. The e↵ect on the dispersion
of opinions is also expected to be particularly large for distressed issuers because their long-term
viability often hinges on the success of new projects. Optimistic investors view a substantial
increase in new funds as good news because it reduces the firm’s short-term default risk and allows
management to undertake new, potentially more profitable, projects. However, given the firm’s
distressed status, there is a high cost associated with raising external capital, and pessimistic
investors do not expect new projects to generate a su cient return to cover this cost. In summary,
there is a large degree of uncertainty regarding whether new projects will pay o↵, and the long-term
viability of distressed firms often depends on the outcome.
Additionally, distressed companies tend to be small volatile companies, which results in their
being more costly to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Stambaugh et al., 2015). Adverse short-
term price movements can force arbitrageurs to provide additional capital while simultaneously
causing investors to lose confidence and consider withdrawing invested funds. On average, distressed
firms also have lower institutional ownership, which has been associated with the availability of
borrowable shares, and short-sale constraints are more likely to be a factor when non-lending
investors hold a greater percentage of shares (Nagel, 2005).
Boehme et al. (2006) emphasizes that if either of the two conditions is not present, short-sale
constraints or dispersion of opinions, overpricing will not occur. For instance, if investors hold a
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wide range of valuation opinions and there are no constraints on short-selling, then if the market
price were to rise above its equilibrium level an increase in shorting activity would force its price
back down. Similarly, in the presence of severe short-selling constraints but no divergence of opinion,
all investors will value the company equally, as there is a lack of extreme optimists or pessimists,
and its equilibrium price will be equal to this common valuation.
Given that investors in distressed firms that raise large amounts of external capital are likely
to have greater dispersion in their valuations and face greater short-sale constraints, I expect over-
valuation will be more prevalent within this subgroup of distressed stocks. The most optimistic
investors are willing to pay a price above the average valuation held by market participants, and
short-selling limitations prevent mispricing from being exploited by arbitrageurs. This leads to the
main hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. The underperformance of distressed stocks relative to healthy stocks (i.e. the
distress anomaly) is concentrated among firms with high external financing activity in the prior
year.
Overly optimistic valuations can exist in the presence of short-selling constraints coupled with
di↵erences of opinion; however, over time the uncertainty regarding the fair value of firms will
gradually be reduced as value relevant information reaches the market. Although information is
provided to investors through a variety of events throughout the year (e.g., press releases, analysts’
forecasts, etc.), I focus on quarterly earnings announcements, as they provide investors with an
o cial update on how the firm is performing and typically involve a conference call in which man-
agement discusses both the prior and upcoming quarters. On average, it is expected that the most
optimistic investors will be disappointed by the actual results. This leads to the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. A significant portion of the underperformance of distressed stocks with high ex-
ternal financing activity occurs around quarterly earnings announcements.
Within the group of highly distressed, high external financing firms, there is likely to be some
additional variation in the degree of dispersion in investor’s valuations produced by external financ-
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ing events as well as di↵erences in the severity of short-selling constraints. For instance, external
financing activity will likely generate a wider range of opinions among younger firms, because their
limited history adds to the challenge in establishing an accurate valuation. Likewise, low analyst
coverage is also expected to allow for a greater dispersion of opinions, as professional analysts’ esti-
mates provide a point of reference in establishing an appropriate valuation. In terms of short-selling
limitations, stocks with lower institutional ownership are more likely to face constraints that are
binding, and stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility will be more costly to arbitrage because of
the inability of arbitrageurs to fully hedge against adverse price movements. This leads to the final
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The underperformance of distressed stocks among firms with high external fi-
nancing growth is more severe for firms that are more di cult to value and more costly to sell
short.
2.3 External Financing, Financial Distress, and the Distress
Anomaly
This section details the construction of the external financing and distress variables and also
reviews existing evidence on the distress anomaly. The full sample consists of all firms with non-
missing data used to construct the distress and external financing variables as well as available
monthly returns. Returns and stock prices are from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP), and accounting data is from the Compustat Annual and Quarterly Fundamental Files.
The full sample includes 1,108,901 firm-month observations during the sample period from 1981 to
2014, which coincides with the start date used in Campbell et al. (2008), as it has been documented
that failures were relatively infrequent before the 1980s.22
2.3.1 External Financing
To explore the e↵ect of external financing on firm performance and the distress anomaly, I
construct a measure following Bradshaw et al. (2006) using information from the statement of cash
22Additionally, Eisdorfer et al. (2013) note the availability of quarterly Compustat data is more limited in earlier
years.
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flows from the Compustat Annual files. Specifically, I define net external financing, XFIN, as the
sum of net equity related financing, EFIN, and net debt related financing, DFIN,
XFIN = EFIN +DFIN (2.1)
where EFIN is computed as total funds received from the sale of common and preferred stock
(SSTK) less funds paid towards the purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC) less cash
dividends (DV), and DFIN is computed as funds raised from the issuance of long-term debt (DLTIS)
less funds paid toward long-term debt reduction (DLTR) plus changes in current debt (DLCCH).
I require the availability of all cash flow variables with the exception of changes in current debt,
which is set to zero if missing. I scale XFIN, EFIN, and DFIN by average total assets (AT) so
that the financing variables take into account the relative size of each firm. Additionally, the three
financing variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles in order to reduce the e↵ects of
outliers.
2.3.2 Financial Distress
Throughout the vast literature on financial distress there are a number of commonly used ways
to quantify distress. Two approaches that have been popular, especially in early studies, are the
models of Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980), which use accounting variables to predict bankruptcy.
Additionally, the Moody’s KMV model, which relies on the structural default model of Merton
(1974), has received considerable use from both academics and practitioners. In this paper, I use
the distress measure from CHS (2008) in the main analysis, which is constructed by estimating the
12-month-ahead probability of failure using a logit model.
Aside from utilizing more recent data the CHS (2008) measure o↵ers several advantages. First,
the model utilizes both accounting and market data and is shown to have better predictive power
than competing models. Further, failure is defined more broadly to include not only firms that file
for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy but also those that receive a D credit rating from a leading
credit rating agency or delist from their stock exchange for financial reasons. This is advantageous
as many years contain relatively few bankruptcies, and many financially troubled firms never reach
bankruptcy. Finally, asset pricing studies generally find greater return spreads between healthy and
distressed firms when using the CHS variable, likely because it captures the risk of failure more
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precisely. To construct this measure I combine monthly market data from CRSP with quarterly
accounting data from Compustat and utilize the results from the CHS (2008) logit model. To
help ensure the availability of accounting information, I lag all Compustat data by 4 months. The
distress measure is computed as follows:
CHSit =   9.16  20.26NIMTAAV Git + 1.42TLMTAit   7.13EXRETAV Git
+ 1.41SIGMAit   0.045RSIZEit   2.13CASHMTAit + 0.075MBit
  0.058PRICEit (2.2)
where NIMTA is net income (NIQ) divided by the market value of assets, TLMTA is the book
value of liabilities (LTQ) divided by the market value of assets, EXRET is the log of the excess
return on the firm’s stock relative to the S&P 500 Index, SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily
returns over the past three months, RSIZE is the ratio of the log of the firm’s market capitalization
(PRC x SHROUT / 1000) relative to that of the S&P 500 index, CASHMTA is the firm’s cash
and short-term investments (CHEQ) scaled by the market value of assets, MB is the market-to-
book ratio23, and PRICE is the log of the firm’s price per share (PRC) truncated from above at
$15. NIMTAAVG and EXRETAVG represent weighted moving averages of NIMTA and EXRET.
I construct these following CHS (2008) as
NIMTAAV Gt 1,t 12 =
1   3
1   12 (NIMTAt 1,t 3 + . . .+  
9NIMTAt 10,t 12) (2.3)
EXRETAV Gt 1,t 12 =
1   
1   12 (EXRETt 1 + . . .+  
11EXRETt 12) (2.4)
where   = 2 
1
3 .24 All inputs are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles of the pooled sample. To
limit transaction costs and the e↵ects of bid-ask bounce, I eliminate all stocks with prices below $1
at the time of portfolio formation and only include the common stocks of non-financial firms (i.e.,
exclude SIC codes 6000 to 6999) that trade on NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX. Because distressed
stocks face an increased likelihood of being delisted, delisting returns are incorporated into a stock’s
final monthly return whenever available. Failing to do this would likely impart an upward bias on
23Book value is measured quarterly as in Hou et al. (2015). In particular, book equity is shareholders’ equity plus
balance-sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (TXDITCQ), if available, minus the book value of preferred
stock. Depending on availability, I use stockholders’ equity (SEQQ), or common equity (CEQQ) plus the carrying
value of preferred stock (PSTKQ), or total assets (ATQ) less total liabilities (LTQ) in that order as shareholders’
equity. Preferred stock is measured as the redemption value (PSTKRQ) if available, or the carrying value of preferred
stock, or zero if both are missing.
24I refer the interested reader to CHS (2008) for further details on the distress variable’s construction.
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the returns to distressed stocks, both in general and relative to healthy stocks.
2.3.3 Distress Anomaly Overview
The finding in Dichev (1998) that high bankruptcy risk firms earn significantly lower returns
than similar healthy firms has led to a substantial body of research which has sought to explain this
seemingly anomalous result (e.g., Campbell et al., 2008; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Garlappi
and Yan, 2011; Conrad et al., 2014; Friewald et al., 2014; Hackbarth et al., 2015). In Table 2.1,
Panel A explores the strength of the distress anomaly within the current sample period by sorting
all firms into equal-sized deciles based on their estimated level of distress at the end of the previous
month. A portfolio that is long stocks in the least distressed decile (i.e. healthy stocks) and short
stocks in the most distressed decile (i.e. distressed stocks) is also constructed to test the di↵erence
in performance. Presented are the average excess-returns for each of the value-weighted decile
portfolios and the long-short portfolio as well as alphas with respect to the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM), Fama-French 3-factor model, and Carhart 4-factor model.25
The seven decile portfolios with the lowest failure risk (D1 to D7) exhibit fairly limited variation
in average returns, which is perhaps unsurprising as their di↵erences in failure probability are
also very small. However, there is a substantial drop o↵ when moving to the eighth, ninth, and
tenth deciles, as these portfolios earn average monthly excess returns of 0.43%, 0.12% and -0.20%,
respectively. The average return di↵erence between the portfolio of the healthiest firms (D1) and the
most distressed firms (D10) is 0.93% and statistically significant. Additionally, the CAPM, Fama-
French 3-factor model, and Carhart 4-factor model fail to explain the returns to the long-short
portfolio resulting in average monthly abnormal returns of 1.42%, 1.77%, and 0.87%, respectively.
These results are similar to those reported in the existing literature and confirm the existence of
the distress anomaly in the current sample period.
Panel B reports the factor loadings from the Carhart 4-factor model regressions, which despite
failing to explain the low returns to distressed stocks, perform the best of the three models. Focusing
on the long-short (D1–D10) portfolio, it is observed that the factor loadings are significantly negative
on the model’s market (MKT), size (SMB), and value factors (HML). This lowers the expected
25There is evidence that more recently developed asset pricing models explain a greater percentage of the return
spread between healthy and distressed firms. Such models are considered in later tests; however, the focus in this
table is on confirming existing evidence of the distress anomaly within the current sample.
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return of the portfolio; thus, e↵ectively increasing its abnormal return and explains why the alpha
relative to the Fama-French 3-factor model is much larger. The addition of the momentum factor
(UMD) appears to capture much of the outperformance of healthy stocks relative to distressed
stocks, as its inclusion reduces the long-short portfolio’s abnormal return by more than half (1.77%
to 0.87%); however, it is still highly significant (t = 3.12). In fact, the UMD factor loadings decrease
monotonically from the decile portfolio of healthiest stocks (D1) to most distressed stocks (D10).
The decline in momentum loadings as distress increases is expected, as healthier stocks tend to
have experienced higher past returns than distressed stocks by construction.
Average firm level characteristics are presented in Panel C. Characteristic values are found by
first computing the cross-sectional means and medians across all firms within each portfolio and then
computing the time series averages of these values. The patterns revealed in the characteristics
suggest that distressed firms tend to have smaller market capitalizations, lower market-to-book
ratios, and lower past returns, which is consistent with the patterns in the factor loadings.
The CHS failure probability increases monotonically across the portfolios by construction, since
this is the sorting variable used to construct the portfolios. Interestingly, the average values of net
external financing are also strictly increasing when moving from the lowest to highest distress decile.
Firms in the portfolio of healthiest stocks have an average external financing ratio of -2.57%. This
suggests these firms use more money towards paying dividends, repurchasing stock, and paying o↵
debt than they raise by borrowing new funds and issuing stock, as healthy companies are generally
able to rely on strong earnings to support growth. In contrast, distressed firms rely more heavily
on external capital with the average firm raising outside funds net of any payouts equal to 9.34% of
average assets. This suggests the external financing e↵ect could potentially impact a large number
of distressed stocks given their tendency to rely on external capital.
Figure 2.1 graphically highlights the severity of the underperformance of distressed stocks over
the sample period. This figure presents the cumulative monthly returns to investments in: (1)
the decile portfolio of healthiest stocks; (2) the decile portfolio of most distressed stocks; (3) the
market portfolio; and (4) the risk-free asset. Also reported on the right-hand side of the figure are
ending balances given an initial investment of $1 in each portfolio. The portfolio of healthy stocks
tracks the market quite closely but results in a higher final balance ($56.40 vs. $36.63). This is not
particularly surprising since healthy firms tend to be larger and less volatile than other companies
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and often follow the general movements of the market. In contrast, the distressed portfolio performs
far worse than the overall market and results in an even lower cumulative return than an investment
in the risk-free asset ($0.23 vs. $4.48). Its extreme volatility and poor average performance both
contribute to this anomalous finding.
Table 2.2 reports correlations for the main variables of interest over the full sample period.
In addition to the distress and external financing variables, the table includes the log of firm size
(market cap), log book-to-market, and the cumulative return from month t-12 to t-2 (Mom). The
correlations are computed using only the observations from the end of each fiscal year, since all
variables except CHS and Mom are updated annually.
The first column shows that net external financing is more highly correlated with equity fi-
nancing than debt financing, although both correlations are large by construction. Consistent with
evidence from the distress portfolio sorts, I find that external financing is also positively correlated
with the CHS failure probability as distressed firms tend to raise more external capital relative to
their existing asset bases on average; however, the correlation coe cient is modest at 0.108. The
table also indicates that the external financing variable tends to be larger for small firms and low
book-to-market firms but exhibits a very weak relation with past returns.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
This section tests the hypothesis that the distress anomaly will be concentrated among firms
with high prior year external financing activity. The extreme balance sheet growth of these firms
and uncertainty associated with new projects is predicted to create a large dispersion of beliefs
among investors regarding their fair values. In the presence of short-selling constraints, which are
more severe for distressed firms, only the most optimistic investors will take positions in their stocks
leading to overvaluation. In contrast, distressed firms with limited external financing growth, whose
operations are more stable, are predicted to be fairly valued and earn returns commensurate with
their level of risk.
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2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
In order to study the relation between recent external financing activity and the distress
anomaly, I sort all firms into portfolios based on their values of the distress and external financing
measures. Each month I first assign all stocks to distress quintile portfolios based on their com-
puted CHS value. Subsequently the stocks within each portfolio are divided into quintiles again
based on each firm’s level of XFIN to form 25 double-sorted portfolios.26
Table 2.3 displays the average firm-level characteristics for each portfolio. Panels A and B
show again that distressed firms tend to have smaller market capitalizations and lower market-
to-book ratios. One notable exception to this general pattern, however, is the high distress, high
external financing portfolio whose firms have an average market-to-book ratio of 2.50. Thus, while
most distressed stocks are considered value stocks based on their depressed valuations, the firms in
this portfolio have valuations consistent with investors expecting significant growth despite their
current distressed status. Interestingly, all five of the portfolios in the top quintile of recent external
financing growth (XFIN5) have relatively high average market-to-book ratios, ranging from 2.28 to
2.50; however, no concrete inferences can by drawn from these simple statistics as higher valuations
can reflect higher growth potential, overvaluation, or some combination of the two.
Panels C, D, and E report the average values of EFIN, DFIN, and XFIN. The high distress,
high external financing portfolio stands out as these firms raised substantial amounts of capital
within the past year relative to their existing asset bases. On average, their net external financing
ratio is equal to 42.95%, and they raise funds through a combination of debt and equity.27 It is
also observed that most healthy firms have made net payments to investors as three of the five
portfolios in the least distressed quintile (D1) have negative average values of XFIN. Additionally,
Panel F shows that the sorting procedure works well in minimizing di↵erences in failure probability.
The average CHS distress measure is similar across di↵erent external financing portfolios in the
same distress quintile; therefore, di↵erences in failure probability are unlikely to account for large
di↵erences in the strength of the distress anomaly for di↵erent XFIN levels.
26Independent sorts are used as a robustness test with the performance results presented in Appendix Table A2.1.
With independent sorting, the high distress, high external financing portfolio contains slightly more than double the
average number of firms in the high distress, low external financing portfolio.
27EFIN and DFIN are winsorized after being added together to generate XFIN. This helps to ensure that any
extreme refinancing transactions (e.g. issuing large amounts of stock to payo↵ debt) do not impact net external
financing but does not always preserve the equality between XFIN and its components.
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The final two panels report summary statistics for idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) and institu-
tional ownership, which are proxies for the degree of short-sale constraints. Panel G presents the
average firm IVOL, computed monthly as the standard deviation of daily return residuals relative
to the Carhart 4-factor model (annualized). Prior research has highlighted the role of IVOL in
limiting arbitrage. Mispricing among a stock with no IVOL can be exploited without much risk,
as arbitrageurs are able to fully hedge against its price movements by taking o↵setting positions
in other financial securities; however, maintaining a short position becomes increasingly risky as
IVOL increases. As a result, prior research shows that an arbitrageur’s optimal position in a se-
curity is decreasing in the level of IVOL (Ponti↵, 2006; Stambaugh et al., 2015). Thus, the table
suggests that distressed stocks present far greater arbitrage risk, as the mean IVOL of stocks in the
five distressed portfolios ranges from 70.28% to 72.28% compared to a range of 24.74% to 30.18%
among healthy firms.
Panel H presents average values of institutional ownership, which is measured as the percentage
of shares owned by institutional investors using information from Thomson Reuters’ 13-F filings
data. Institutional ownership is an additional proxy for short-selling constraints because in order
to short a stock arbitrageurs must be able to locate shares to borrow, which is typically done
through institutional owners (D’Avolio, 2002; Nagel, 2005). The reported values provide further
evidence that distressed firms face greater short-sale limitations, as average institutional ownership
decreases substantially with the level of distress. It is also worth noting that because all distressed
stock portfolios exhibit similar values for both IVOL and institutional ownership, di↵erences in
arbitrage risk are unlikely to explain di↵erences in their performance; rather, the data suggests the
potential for mispricing is generally greater among all distressed stock portfolios.
2.4.2 Double-Sorted Portfolio Returns
I now evaluate the performance of the twenty-five portfolios formed by double-sorting firms
on their levels of distress, CHS, and external financing, XFIN, in addition to the returns to zero
net-investment portfolios that are long healthy firms and short distressed firms within each external
financing quintile. This allows for an evaluation of how the strength of the distress anomaly varies
with prior external financing activity, and as stated in Hypothesis 1, I expect the underperformance
of distressed stocks will be concentrated among firms in the high external financing quintile. In
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addition to adjusting for risk using the Carhart model, I also consider the 5-factor model that
includes the Pastor and Stambaugh liquidity factor, Fama-French 5-factor model (with and without
an additional factor for momentum), a model with the quality minus junk factor of Asness et al.
(2014), and the Hou, Xue, and Zhang q-factor model.28
In Table 2.4, Panel A displays the excess returns and Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) q-factor
model alphas with value-weighted portfolios. The performance relative to the q-factor model is
emphasized, because this model performs best in the sense that it leaves the smallest average
absolute alphas among the five long-short portfolios; however, the performance relative to the
remaining factor models is considered subsequently.
Focusing first on the long-short portfolio returns unadjusted for risk (left-hand side), I find
that distressed stocks actually outperform healthy stocks within the bottom two external financing
quintiles, as the average monthly returns are -0.08% and -0.36% among the XFIN1 and XFIN2
firms. This is surprising given the severe underperformance of distressed firms overall during the
sample period. Within the XFIN3 quintile the long-short portfolio earns an average return of
0.30% per month but is not significantly di↵erent from zero (t = 0.69). The distress-based long-
short portfolio returns become statistically significant among the XFIN4 stocks with an average
monthly return of 0.91% (t = 2.27) but are substantially larger among stocks in the top external
financing quintile, XFIN5, at 1.97% per month (t = 4.66). This suggests the vast majority of the
distress anomaly profits are generated by firms with high levels of external financing within the
past year consistent with Hypothesis 1.
The excess returns to the five high distress (D5) portfolios also exhibit large di↵erences in per-
formance. The portfolios of distressed stocks in the two lowest external financing quintiles, XFIN1
and XFIN2, perform quite well, earning average excess returns of 0.82% and 0.93% per month,
respectively. These are also the only two distressed portfolios that distribute more funds to in-
vestors than they receive on average. In contrast, distressed firms in the top quintile of external
financing (XFIN5) do much worse than the risk-free rate averaging an astonishingly low excess
return of -1.26% per month. With large dispersion in investor beliefs, the degree of overvaluation
is expected to be substantial when short-sale constraints cause arbitrageurs to have limited partic-
28Results relative to the CAPM and Fama-French 3-factor model are also considered but not reported. For both
models, the average estimated alphas are considerably larger in magnitude compared to the models presented.
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ipation. Such overvaluation is subsequently reflected in future underperformance consistent with
the findings here.
While the distress-based long-short portfolio earns much higher returns among high XFIN
stocks, I test whether di↵erences in risk factor exposures can explain these findings. The right-
hand side of the panel presents portfolio alphas relative to the q-factor model, which leaves the
smallest average pricing errors of the models considered and includes factors related to the market,
size, investment, and profitability. In unreported results, I find the investment factor loadings are
more negative for high XFIN stocks, thereby explaining some of the underperformance associated
with firms with high external financing. Additionally, portfolios of healthy firms tend to have
much larger loadings on the profitability factor but much smaller loadings on the market and size
factors, so these risk adjustments partially o↵set one another. In each XFIN quintile, however, the
long-short portfolio alpha is lower than its average return.
Within the bottom four external financing quintiles the long-short portfolio alphas are not
significant at the five percent level with values ranging from -0.55 to 0.32. This suggests the q-
factor model is relatively successful in explaining the return spreads between healthy and distressed
stocks including the return spread in the XFIN4 quintile. In contrast, the model fails to explain
most of the long-short portfolio’s return in the XFIN5 quintile, as the average monthly alpha is
large at 1.22% and highly significant (t = 3.62). This highlights that the distress anomaly is
concentrated in the group of firms with high external financing activity.29
It is also worth noting that the returns to the portfolios of healthy firms are well explained by
the q-factor model. All of the portfolios within the D1 quintile have alphas that are near zero and
insignificant, and any abnormal returns to the long-short portfolios are derived almost exclusively
from shorting distressed firms. For instance, focusing on the XFIN5 portfolios where the distress
anomaly is concentrated, the portfolio of healthy firms has an insignificant alpha of -0.00% (t =
-0.01) while the portfolio of distressed firms has a highly significant negative alpha of -1.22% (t =
-4.26) per month. This supports the prediction that the distress anomaly profits are derived from
overvaluation of distressed stocks in the short leg.
Panel B presents the results using equal-weighted portfolio returns. Overall, the same general
29In unreported results, I find the e↵ects of momentum are well captured by the q-factor model’s profitability
factor, as suggested in Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015). The alphas are nearly identical when adding the momentum
factor, UMD, to their model. For example, the high external financing long-short portfolio alpha is 1.18%.
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pattern is observed, as the distress anomaly profits are far more substantial within the high external
financing quintile where the long-short portfolio average return is 1.72% per month. Conversely,
within the bottom two XFIN quintiles the average monthly return is negative, and within the
XFIN3 quintile it is small and near zero. This indicates that distress, by itself, does not lead to
low future returns among the majority of stocks.
Figure 2.2 graphically illustrates the extreme di↵erences in the performance of distressed stocks
depending upon their level of prior year external financing activity. Plotted are the cumulative
gains of a $1 investment made in: (1) the portfolio of high distress, low XFIN stocks; (2) the
portfolio of high distress, high XFIN stocks; (3) the market portfolio; and (4) the risk-free asset.
The portfolio of distressed stocks in the lowest external financing quintile performs similarly to the
overall stock market, resulting in a final balance of $26.49. Additionally, the portfolio of distressed
stocks in the XFIN2 quintile (not shown) performs even better over the sample period producing
an ending balance of $39.25. In contrast, a $1 investment in the portfolio of distressed firms with
high external financing results in a final balance of two-tenths of one cent – a cumulative loss of
99.8%. The extreme losses experienced by this subgroup of firms drives the overall low returns to
distressed stocks.
The results indicate that external financing has a large impact on the future performance of
distressed stocks; however, instead of investor overoptimism, it is possible that other known risk
factors are able to explain these findings. To explore this possibility in Table 2.5, Panel A reports
the performance of the five distress-based long-short portfolios relative to other well-known factor
models.30
When adjusting for risk using the Carhart 4-factor model the long-short portfolio alphas within
the bottom three XFIN quintiles are insignificant and close to zero. These portfolios present less of
a challenge for most factor models, as the unadjusted excess returns are also small and insignificant.
Turning to the XFIN4 and XFIN5 portfolios it is observed that the Carhart model fares considerably
worse than the q-factor model in explaining the strength of the distress anomaly, as the long-short
portfolio alpha is now also significant within the XFIN4 quintile (0.74, t = 2.54) and is much larger
30I would like to thank the respective authors for making their factors available. I obtain data on the MKT, SMB,
HML, and UMD factors from Ken French’s data library, as well as for the RMW and CMA factors used in the
Fama-French five-factor model. Data on the risk-free rate as proxied by the one-month T-bill return is also found
here. The liquidity factor is obtained from Lubos Pastor’s website, and the quality minus junk factor is obtained
from the AQR data library. Lu Zhang provided data for the q-factor model factors through email correspondence.
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within the XFIN5 quintile (1.74, t = 5.86). Thus, the Carhart model is unable to account for the
underperformance of the high distress, high external financing stocks. When adding the Pastor and
Stambaugh liquidity factor as an additional control the results are largely unchanged; consequently,
di↵erences in liquidity risk are unlikely to explain the findings.
Next, I report portfolio alphas relative to the Fama-French 5-factor model, which like the q-
factor model has the advantage of controlling for both profitability and investment. Both of these
factors could help explain the abnormal returns, as healthy firms are considerably more profitable
than distressed firms, and the investment factor may capture some of the e↵ects associated with
external financing. The results, however, suggest these factors do little to explain the underperfor-
mance of the high distress, high external financing portfolio, as the long-short portfolio generates a
significant monthly alpha of 1.92% (t = 5.17) within the highest external financing quintile. Fama
and French (2015) report that although they do not include a momentum factor in their 5-factor
model, when the left-hand-side portfolios have a strong momentum tilt, like the portfolios formed on
distress do, including a momentum factor is crucial. Consequently, I also measure the performance
of the long-short portfolios relative to their model augmented with an additional factor for momen-
tum, UMD. This model does better at capturing the returns to the long-short portfolios, but it
does not come close to fully eliminating the large alpha among high external financing stocks which
is still 1.39% (t = 4.63). The alphas for the other four long-short portfolios are all insignificant at
the five percent level with estimated abnormal returns ranging from -0.49% to 0.44%.
Finally, I also measure abnormal returns relative to a model consisting of the market factor in
addition to the quality-minus-junk (QMJ) factor utilized in Asness et al. (2014). In their study,
Asness et al. show that investors pay a higher price for high quality stocks but not by a very large
margin, which results in high quality stocks earning a superior risk-adjusted return. However, the
results indicate that this model tends to underpredict the returns to distressed stocks within the
XFIN1 and XFIN2 quintiles, as both long-short portfolios yield a significantly negative abnormal
return. The model is also unable to explain the low returns to the high distress, high external
financing portfolio, and the long-short portfolio within the XFIN5 quintile earn a significantly
positive abnormal return (1.11, t = 3.19). As always, there remains a possibility that an unidentified
source of risk can explain the underperformance of the highly distressed stocks with high prior
external financing activity. However, the severe failures of current asset pricing models is consistent
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with the hypothesis that extreme external financing growth causes optimistic investors to overpay
for the possibility that a distressed firm will make a comeback, and the remaining analysis provides
tests to support this explanation.
To ensure the results are robust and not specific to a particular subsample, Panel B first divides
the full sample into periods of expansion and recession based on the business cycle dates according
to NBER. Within the bottom four external financing quintiles, the healthy minus distressed long-
short portfolio only earns a significant return in the XFIN4 quintile during periods of expansion
(0.98, t = 2.41) and the return is insignificant for all four portfolios during recessions. Conversely,
within the XFIN5 quintile of high external financing firms, the long-short portfolio yields large
average monthly returns in both subsamples, earning 1.86% during periods of expansion and 2.65%
during periods of recession. Despite being considerably larger, the average return during recessions
is not statistically significant, as the standard error is much higher because of the smaller sample
size. The full sample period contains 354 expansionary months compared to only 54 months that
are part of economic recessions. These results suggest variation in performance over the business
cycle is unlikely to explain the findings, since similar patterns are found within both sub-periods.
Additionally, for systematic risk related to the business cycle to explain the findings, the high
distress, high external financing portfolio would need to earn higher returns during recessions,
thereby, providing investors with a greater payo↵ when the marginal utility of wealth is higher.
Also reported are the average returns to the long-short portfolios during the 1980s, 1990s, and
from the year 2000 to the end of the sample period. The evidence suggests the underperformance of
the high distress, high external financing portfolio persisted throughout the sample period and was
particularly strong during the 1980s and 1990s, as the long-short portfolio of XFIN5 stocks earned
significant average monthly returns of 2.30% and 2.45%, respectively. From the year 2000 forward
this portfolio still earned large albeit lower returns, but the result is only marginally significant
(1.45, t = 1.79). The reduced significance in the final subperiod can largely be attributed to the
increased volatility and higher returns earned by distressed stocks immediately following the 2008
financial crisis, as documented by Eisdorfer and Misirli (2016).31 This is also consistent with there
31In their study, Eisdorfer and Misirli report that subsequent to the top 10 bear markets in their sample the decile
portfolio of most distressed stocks outperformed the decile portfolio of healthiest stocks by an average of 10.23% per
month. Similar “crashes” are shown to occur for momentum strategies in Daniel and Moskowitz (2015) during which
loser stocks rebound.
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being limited overoptimism in the aftermath of the crisis.
Panel C presents the results when extending the portfolio holding period, which addresses the
concern that the results are sensitive to rebalancing frequency. I consider holding periods of 6,
12, and 18 months where the portfolio weights are allowed to drift with returns to prevent the
need for any rebalancing adjustments. For each rebalancing frequency, none of the long-short
portfolios within the bottom four external financing quintiles earn a significant average monthly
return, whereas the portfolio of high external financing firms does in all cases. As expected, the
return to the long-short portfolio within XFIN5 becomes smaller when the rebalancing frequency
is extended, as stocks are then held in the portfolio based on increasingly stale information, but
the return is still large and highly significant even when rebalancing as infrequently as once every
eighteen months.
2.4.3 Fama-MacBeth Regressions with Distress and External Financing
To further explore the interaction between financial distress and external financing activity,
I also conduct cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. This approach allows for an
evaluation of the CHS -XFIN interaction strength while directly controlling for other standard
return predictors. In addition, I am able to measure the marginal impact of distress on future
returns and evaluate whether it has any predictive power not captured by its interaction with
external financing. The results from these regressions are presented in Table 2.6, and the main
specification displayed in the fifth row takes the form:
Reti,t+1 =  0 +  1log(Sizei,t) +  2log(B/Mi,t) +  3Momi,t +  4CHSi,t +  5XFINi,t
+  6CHS · XFINi,t + ei,t+1 (2.5)
where the dependent variable is the monthly stock return in excess of the risk-free rate and the
independent variables include the log market capitalization (Size), log book-to-market (B/M),
cumulative return from month t-12 to t-2 (Mom), distress failure probability (CHS), external
financing (XFIN), and an interaction term between the distress and external financing variables.32
I multiply all coe cients by 100 for readability and report t-statistics based on Fama-MacBeth
standard errors in parentheses.
32In the interest of space, only the most common controls are included. The results are similar with the addition
of further controls for common predictors such as profitability and accruals with the results available upon request.
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The coe cients presented in the table reflect time series averages of the cross-sectional regres-
sion estimates over the full sample period from 1981 to 2014. The first specification does not yet
include the distress or external financing variables but confirms that the sign for each of the controls
is consistent with prior literature. As expected, firm size has a negative though insignificant e↵ect
on returns while book-to-market and momentum are positively associated with future returns. The
second regression adds the CHS failure probability, which enters with a significantly negative coe -
cient (-1.23, t = -2.85), consistent with prior research that finds distressed stocks earn anomalously
low returns. In the third regression the external financing variable, XFIN, is added and found to
have a significantly negative coe cient (-1.87, t = -9.12), as is found in Bradshaw et al. (2006).
Specification four then separates XFIN into its two components, EFIN and DFIN, and indicates
that both equity and debt financing play a role in contributing to lower future returns.
The fifth row presents the main specification, which includes both the distress and external
financing variables as well a term to measure their interaction. As before, the CHS failure proba-
bility has a negative coe cient; however, it is much smaller in magnitude and no longer statistically
significant (-0.73, t = -1.59), as the inclusion of the external financing terms appears to subsume
much of its explanatory power. Interestingly, both XFIN and its interaction with the CHS distress
variable are negative and highly significant. This is consistent with the findings from the portfolio
sorts and suggests that not only do firms that raise large amounts of external financing experience
lower future returns, but the relation between external financing and future returns is also stronger
for firms experiencing severe financial distress as predicted given their greater short sale constraints.
Finally, the sixth regression specification includes EFIN and DFIN and interacts each separately
with the CHS distress measure. Both EFIN and DFIN enter with negative coe cients and are
highly significant. The interactions terms are both negative as well; however, only the DFIN
interaction with CHS is statistically significant at conventional levels. The results presented here are
generally consistent with the evidence in Park (2015), which documents lower returns to distressed
firms that issue common stock, but suggest debt financing has a stronger interaction with the CHS
distress variable. Importantly, the signs on each of the external financing components and their
interaction terms are negative as predicted while the CHS coe cient falls even further (-0.63, t =
-1.37), which suggests that, in contrast to the results in prior research, financial distress only has
a large impact on future returns when coupled with large external financing growth that increases
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the dispersion of opinions about firms’ values.
2.4.4 Abnormal Earnings Announcement Returns
The decisions of distressed firms to raise external capital can create overvaluation, and because of
short-sale limitations selling pressure will be generated primarily when current stockholders choose
to sell their shares. This causes stock prices to remain elevated until the degree of uncertainty is
reduced and optimistic investors revise their beliefs. On average these investors will tend to be
disappointed upon observing the true realization of firm performance. In particular, reductions in
di↵erences of opinion and overvaluation should be concentrated in information rich periods such
as around earnings announcement dates given that new information does not flow linearly to the
market. Thus, Hypothesis 2 predicts that a significant portion of the underperformance of highly
distressed firms with high external financing activity will occur around earnings announcements.
Table 2.7 reports the performance of the twenty-five double-sorted portfolios around earnings
announcements dates to test if a significant amount of the underperformance associated with high
distress, high external financing stocks is, in fact, concentrated in these high information periods.
To measure investor reactions to earnings news over time, I reform portfolios based on the CHS
and XFIN measures at the end of each June and hold them for one year. Following the literature,
cumulative returns are measured from day t-1 to t+1 each quarter, where day t=0 represents the
earnings announcement date. Next, to transform this measure to an abnormal return, I subtract
either the corresponding cumulative return on the market portfolio over the same three-day period
(market-adjusted), or the average earnings announcement return for firms in the same size and book-
to-market quintiles within that quarter (benchmark-adjusted). The benchmark adjusted returns
help to ensure the results are not driven by previously documented book-to-market announcement
e↵ects (Gri n and Lemmon, 2002). The quarterly announcement returns for the year are then
averaged and multiplied by four to produce an annualized figure.
Panel A presents the results with value-weighted portfolio announcement returns. The di↵erence
between the market-adjusted returns earned by healthy firms (D1) and distressed firms (D5) exhibits
a similar pattern to the average returns presented in Table 2.4. In particular, the announcement
returns to distressed firms within the bottom two external financing quintiles are larger than those
earned by healthy firms, although the di↵erences are not statistically significant. In some instances,
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the mere ability to announce earnings may be viewed as a positive signal for distressed companies.
In contrast, within the top external financing quintile, XFIN5, the portfolio of distressed stocks
earns the lowest abnormal announcement returns (-2.84, t = -3.46), and the di↵erence between the
least and most distressed portfolios is large and significant (4.56, t = 3.61). The results for the
benchmark-adjusted returns exhibit a similar pattern. These return di↵erences are economically
large as predicted by Hypothesis 2, especially considering that the earnings announcement windows
reflect a total of only 12 trading days across the four quarters, and investors are likely to obtain
much additional information about firm performance from other events throughout the year.
Panel B displays the results when equal-weighting the abnormal returns for each portfolio,
and the overall results are similar. Within the XFIN5 quintile, the portfolio containing the most
distressed stocks experiences less negative market-adjusted returns than in Panel A, but its under-
performance is still large and significant (-2.24, t = -2.96), as is the di↵erence between the least
and most distressed portfolios (2.72, t = 3.55). The results in this section are consistent with the
predictions of Hypothesis 2 and confirm that the negative returns to the high distress, high external
financing portfolio are more pronounced around earnings announcements when overly optimistic
investors are typically disappointed by the lack of improved profitability.
2.4.5 Limits to Arbitrage and Uncertainty
Large influxes of external capital create uncertainty and significant dispersion in investor valu-
ations, particularly among distressed firms whose long-term survival depends highly on the success
of new capital projects. This can create overvaluation, as greater limits to arbitrage among dis-
tressed stocks allow optimists to bid up stock prices while short-sellers are prevented from taking
a position against them. However, within each portfolio of firms there remains some variation in
both the degree of uncertainty regarding firm valuations as well as short-sale limitations. Conse-
quently, Hypothesis 3 predicts that stock overvaluation and subsequent underperformance will be
most severe for firms that are particularly di cult to value and challenging to sell short.
Table 2.8 tests this hypothesis by considering several proxies for short-sale constraints (Panels
A and B) and uncertainty (Panels C and D) that have been explored in the literature (Nagel,
2005; Boehme et al., 2006; Campbell et al., 2008; Berkman et al., 2009; Stambaugh et al., 2012).
Each month I assign the stocks from each portfolio into two groups, low and high, based on the
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median value of either idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), residual institutional ownership (ResInst),
residual analyst coverage (ResAn), or firm age. I focus only on the portfolios in the highest external
financing quintile, XFIN5, where the underperformance is concentrated and report the excess return
and q-factor model alpha of the long leg (D1), short leg (D5), and the di↵erence (D1–D5).
Panel A reports the results for IVOL, which represents fluctuations in a stock’s price that are
unassociated with risk factors and is considered a proxy for arbitrage risk (Stambaugh et al., 2015).
Consistent with IVOL deterring arbitrageurs from taking a position in overpriced stocks, I find the
healthy minus distressed long-short portfolio earns a large and highly significant abnormal return
among the high IVOL subgroup (1.56, t = 3.82), which is driven primarily by the underperformance
of the short leg. In contrast, among low IVOL stocks a similar long-short portfolio produces a return
that is much smaller and insignificant at conventional levels (0.76, t = 1.52). Within this group,
short-sellers are expected to be more willing to bet against overvalued stocks, thereby limiting
mispricing.
Panel B evaluates the impact of di↵erences in ResInst, which is computed following Campbell
et al. (2008) as the residual from a regression of the percentage of shares owned by institutional
investors on relative size (RSIZE) and year indicator variables. Controlling for RSIZE allows
the measure to capture di↵erences in institutional ownership that are independent of size, as the
two variables are highly correlated. D’Avolio (2002) documents that shares are typically lent
by institutional investors; therefore, short-selling constraints are more likely to a↵ect stocks with
low institutional ownership. Further, Nagel (2005) suggests there is also an indirect channel that
prevents overpricing from correcting, as non-institutional stockholders are less sophisticated and
may be less likely to sell when a stock becomes overpriced. Consistent with these explanations,
I find the underperformance of high distress, high external financing firms is more severe when
ResInst is low.
Panel C explores the influence of residual analyst coverage (ResAn), and Panel D explores the
e↵ect of firm age. Following the literature, I measure ResAn as the residual of a regression of the log
of one plus the number of analysts covering each firm on relative firm size and year indicators, and
I compute Age as the number of years since a firm first entered the CRSP database. Both of these
variables are expected to influence the degree of uncertainty and dispersion in investor opinions.
Specifically, greater analyst coverage can limit the dispersion of opinions and extent of overopti-
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mism, because sell-side analysts provide relatively sophisticated estimates of future performance
that are available to the market. Likewise, older, more-established firms are expected to be easier
to value given their longer operating histories. Consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 3, I
find the underperformance of the high distress, high external financing portfolio is more pronounced
among stocks with lower residual analyst coverage and for younger firms. This adds support to the
overarching explanation that the distress anomaly is driven by the overvaluation of firms with high
external financing growth, which is increasing in the degree of dispersion in investor opinions and
the limitations to short selling.
2.5 Robustness Tests
This section presents robustness tests to rule out alternate explanations for the external financ-
ing e↵ect found among distressed stocks. Specifically, I explore the performance of the double-sorted
portfolios during periods of high and low sentiment. Subsequently, I provide a closer look at how
the relation between the external financing variable and future returns varies with the level of
distress.33
2.5.1 Impact of Investor Sentiment
Stambaugh et al. (2012) document that many asset pricing anomalies are more pronounced
following periods of high sentiment and are either weak or non-existent following periods of low
sentiment. They present an explanation that is similar in that it focuses on mispricing caused by
high sentiment (i.e. overoptimism) combined with impediments to short-selling; however, they focus
on the impact of market-wide sentiment on asset prices more broadly. Although they do not discuss
the source of overoptimism, their study suggests it may be responsible for many anomalies. The
decision to raise external capital represents a firm-specific event capable of generating overvaluation,
and its e↵ects are likely to be amplified by market-wide sentiment. To explore the impact of
sentiment on the distress and external financing double-sorted portfolios, I divide the sample into
periods of high and low sentiment based on the prior month’s value of the investor sentiment index
developed in Baker and Wurgler (2006).
33Appendix Table A2.2 also reports the results from tests comparing the strength of the external financing e↵ect
on distressed stocks to the e↵ect of other relevant characteristics such as book-to-market, skewness, and profitability.
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In Table 2.9, Panel A displays the average monthly returns to portfolios that are long healthy
firms (D1) and short distressed firms (D5) within each external financing quintile. Consistent with
anomaly returns being more pronounced after periods when overall optimism is high, the long-
short portfolio returns are higher within each of the external financing quintiles following periods
of high investor sentiment. In both subsamples the distress anomaly appears strongest among
XFIN5 firms, but following periods of low sentiment the long-short portfolio returns are much
smaller (0.94, t = 1.56) than following periods of high sentiment (3.00, t = 5.17). Further, the
high distress, high external financing portfolio earns an abysmal average excess return of -3.05% (t
= 5.17) during periods of high sentiment, which supports the mispricing hypothesis as distressed
firms are especially prone to overvaluation when both the dispersion of investor opinions is high,
and the market is more optimistic in general.
It is possible that much of the di↵erence in performance between the two subsamples can be
attributed to certain risk factors having higher or lower returns when sentiment is high. The
evidence in Panel B reflects this possibility, as the q-factor model alphas are very similar between
the high and low sentiment subsamples. In each instance, only the abnormal return to the healthy
minus distressed long-short portfolio consisting of XFIN5 firms is statistically significant, and the
unexplained outperformance of healthy stocks relative to distressed stocks is similar in magnitude
during times of low (1.16, t = 2.72) and high sentiment (1.24, t = 2.55). Overall, the results suggest
that market sentiment can amplify the degree of overvaluation associated with high distress, high
external financing stocks, but it also does not drive the results.
2.5.2 The Level of Distress and the Strength of the External Financing
E↵ect
Next, I investigate how the impact of external financing varies with the level of distress by
dividing the full sample into quintiles based on the CHS distress variable and conducting cross-
sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions separately on each group of stocks. This approach
allows for an in-depth look at how the relative importance of all return predictors, including ex-
ternal financing, change as the level of firm distress increases without needing to estimate multiple
interaction terms. Another useful feature is the ability to conduct formal di↵erence-in-means tests
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for whether the impact of a predictor variable is equal for two groups.34
The primary focus is on how the XFIN coe cient changes across distress quintiles. As before, I
predict its impact will be more negative among highly distressed firms, as their stocks are generally
subject to greater short-sale constraints and new capital projects are associated with a wide range
of possible outcomes and investor opinions. In each specification the dependent variable is the
monthly return in excess of the risk-free rate, and the control variables include the log of firm
size, log book-to-market, momentum, negative accruals, positive accruals, positive profitability, a
dummy variable for negative profitability, and external financing.35 The cross-sectional regressions
take the form:
Reti,t+1 =  0 +  1log(Sizei,t) +  2log(B/Mi,t) +  3Momi,t +  4negAcci,t +  5posAcci,t
+  6posROEi,t +  7negROEi,t +  8XFINi,t + ei,t+1 (2.6)
The results from Table 2.10 indicate that the XFIN variable has a negative impact on next
period returns and is statistically significant within all distress quintiles; however, its coe cient
and t-statistic decrease monotonically when moving from the quintile of least distressed to most
distressed firms. The coe cient on the XFIN variable also appears to decrease somewhat gradually
across the first four distress quintiles, ranging from -0.91 to -1.54, before falling sharply to -2.46
in the most distressed quintile (D5). This suggests that external financing activity is associated
with particularly low future returns among the most distressed stocks, as its estimated coe cient
is more than two-and-a-half times greater among D5 firms than D1 firms.
The final row tests whether the coe cients of the cross-sectional regressions estimated using
only D5 stocks di↵er significantly from the coe cients obtained when including all non-D5 stocks.
Highlighting the strength of the external financing e↵ect among distressed stocks, the di↵erence in
estimated coe cients is largest for the XFIN variable, as its impact is significantly more negative
among D5 firms (-1.21, t = -4.06).
The log book-to-market and negative accruals variables are the only other predictors to exhibit
significant di↵erences in coe cients between distressed stocks and all other stocks (-0.28, t = -2.73
34This procedure is similar to that of Fama and French (2008) who divide their full sample into three groups
(micro, small, and big) based on market cap and explore the predictive strength of the most well-documented
anomaly variables within each group.
35These controls consist of all of the variables from the dissecting anomalies regressions of Fama and French (2008)
with the exception of net stock issuance and asset growth per share which present natural collinearity issues when
included with external financing.
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and 0.62, t = 2.59; respectively), and the di↵erences are much smaller in magnitude. Interestingly,
the coe cient on log book-to-market is smaller for distressed firms than for all other firms. This is in
contrast to the findings of Gri n and Lemmon (2002) who document that the book-to-market e↵ect
is more pronounced among distressed stocks. Although their study uses an earlier sample period,
in unreported results, I find the coe cient on book-to-market is larger for the group of D5 firms
compared to non-D5 firms when XFIN is dropped from the regressions, which is consistent with
their findings and suggests the external financing variable captures the e↵ect. The results from this
section confirm that external financing activity is associated with severe underperformance among
distressed stocks and has a much larger impact than other widely studied anomaly variables.
2.6 Conclusion
This study provides an explanation for the underperformance of distressed stocks and finds that
the well-documented distress anomaly only exists among firms with high recent external financing
activity. The decision by distressed firms to raise external capital can generate significant over-
pricing by producing a divergence of investor opinions. The most optimistic investors assign high
valuations, as the additional funds provide firms with liquidity and allow them to undertake new
projects that can facilitate a recovery, whereas more pessimistic investors assign low valuations, as
external capital comes with a high cost and new projects may not payo↵. In the presence of short-
sale impediments, however, which I show are more severe for distressed companies, only the most
optimistic investors influence a stock’s price while arbitrageurs take no position in the stock. This
results in a market price above the average valuation of all market participants that is increasing
in the degree of dispersion in beliefs. As a result, I expect the distress anomaly will be driven by
low returns to distressed firms with high external financing activity.
The empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation. By sorting firms into portfolios
based on their levels of distress and net external financing, I find the distress anomaly, measured
as the outperformance of healthy stocks relative to distressed stocks, only exists among firms in
the highest external financing quintile. Further, this healthy minus distressed long-short portfolio
derives its abnormal returns almost exclusively from the underperformance of the high distress,
high external financing portfolio which is large, persistent, and cannot be explained by previously
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identified risk factors. In contrast, existing factor models can explain the returns to the remaining
eighty percent of distressed stocks. In fact, within the bottom two quintiles distressed stocks earn
higher returns than healthy stocks, although the di↵erence is not statistically significant.
The external financing explanation also implies that when new value-relevant information
reaches the market, the overvaluation of highly distressed, high external financing firms will be
reduced, as optimistic investors will be disappointed on average and revise their expectations down-
ward. To test this empirically, I measure the performance of the double-sorted portfolios around
earnings announcement dates when investors receive an update of firms’ actual performance. The
results support this view, as a significant portion of the underperformance of the high distress, high
external financing portfolio is concentrated in these periods.
Finally, I also explore characteristics that make firms more challenging to value or subject to
greater short-sale constraints, both of which are expected to increase the external financing e↵ect.
Consistent with this, I document more negative abnormal returns when firms also have higher
idiosyncratic volatility, lower institutional ownership, lower analyst coverage, and fewer years since
becoming publicly traded. This adds support to the central explanation, as the distribution of
investor opinions is expected to be wider for firms that are more challenging to value, and short-
sale impediments prevent professional arbitrageurs from exploiting potential mispricing.
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Table 2.5: Robustness of Portfolios Sorted on Distress and External Financing
This table reports the performance of zero net-investment portfolios that are long stocks in the
least distressed quintile of firms, D1, and short stocks in the most distressed quintile, D5, within
each external financing quintile. Panel A displays the monthly alphas of these portfolios relative
to the Carhart model, Carhart model plus the Pastor and Stambaugh liquidity factor, LIQ, Fama-
French 5-Factor Model, Fama-French 5-Factor Model plus the momentum factor, UMD, and the
market factor plus quality minus junk factor from Asness et al. (2014). The raw returns to the
long-short portfolios are displayed for subsamples in Panel B. The sample is partitioned into periods
of expansion and recession with recessions defined according to the NBER as well as subperiods
(1981 – 1989, 1990 – 1999, and 2000 – 2014). Panel C presents results excess returns using longer
portfolio holding periods. When rebalancing semi-annually portfolios are reformed at the end of
every June and December, and when rebalancing annually portfolios are only reformed at the end
of June. All returns are in percent per month with corresponding t-statistics below in parentheses.
D1 – D5
XFIN1 XFIN2 XFIN3 XFIN4 XFIN5
Panel A: Alternate Factor Models
Carhart 0.15 -0.20 0.17 0.74 1.74
(0.55) (-0.73) (0.53) (2.54) (5.86)
Carhart + LIQ 0.20 -0.18 0.22 0.85 1.80
(0.72) (-0.65) (0.67) (2.88) (6.00)
FF5F 0.41 -0.23 0.16 0.93 1.92
(1.28) (-0.75) (0.43) (2.59) (5.17)
FF5F + UMD 0.01 -0.49 -0.35 0.44 1.39
(0.03) (-1.76) (-1.10) (1.47) (4.63)
MKT + QMJ -0.94 -1.08 -0.63 0.13 1.11
(-2.83) (-3.67) (-1.77) (0.37) (3.19)
Panel B: Sub-samples
Expansion -0.07 -0.47 0.31 0.98 1.86
(-0.18) (-1.26) (0.72) (2.41) (4.59)
Recession -0.15 0.33 0.27 0.41 2.65
(-0.10) (0.27) (0.15) (0.29) (1.50)
1980s 0.97 -0.04 0.36 1.25 2.30
(2.07) (-0.07) (0.74) (2.75) (4.41)
1990s 0.05 -0.27 0.33 1.35 2.45
(0.07) (-0.45) (0.47) (2.15) (4.01)
2000s -0.81 -0.62 0.25 0.41 1.45
(-1.22) (-0.96) (0.30) (0.54) (1.79)
Panel C: Longer Holding Periods
6 months -0.07 -0.20 0.60 0.75 1.78
(-0.19) (-0.58) (1.52) (1.94) (4.13)
12 months 0.14 -0.55 0.63 0.10 1.50
(0.39) (-1.39) (1.72) (0.27) (3.36)
18 months 0.15 -0.44 -0.11 0.23 1.17
(0.44) (-1.31) (-0.29) (0.62) (2.98)
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Table 2.8: Limits to Arbitrage and Uncertainty
This table evaluates the strength of the distress anomaly among high XFIN firms (top quintile) that
are expected to be more di cult to arbitrage or harder to value. Stocks are first sorted into distress
quintiles (least distressed, D1, to most distressed, D5) and external financing quintiles (low external
financing, XFIN1, to high external financing, XFIN5). We retain only the five portfolios within the
XFIN5 quintile, and each portfolio is then divided evenly into two groups by idiosyncratic volatility,
residual analyst coverage, residual institutional ownership, or firm age. Idiosyncratic volatility is
computed as the standard deviation of residuals from Carhart model regressions estimated on all
trading days in the prior month for each firm, residual institutional ownership is the residual from
regressions of the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors on a firm’s relative size
and year indicator variables, residual analyst coverage is computed in the same manner except the
dependent variable is the log of one plus the number of analysts covering the firm, and firm age is the
number of months since the firm entered the CRSP database. Reported are excess returns and q-
factor model alphas from regressions of the form, Ri,t = ↵i+aMKTt+bMEt+cI/At+dROEt+✏i,t,
where Ri,t is the excess return in month t to either the long leg (D1), the short leg (D5), or the
di↵erence (D1 – D5). The sample period is 1981 to 2014, and all returns and alphas are in percent
per month with corresponding t-statistics below in parentheses.
Excess Return HXZ Q-Factor Alpha
D1 D5 D1–D5 D1 D5 D1–D5
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Volatility (IVOL)
Low IVOL 0.67 -0.48 1.15 -0.05 -0.78 0.76
(2.47) (-0.81) (2.22) (-0.33) (-1.64) (1.52)
High IVOL 1.04 -1.31 2.36 0.38 -1.18 1.56
(2.75) (-2.43) (5.25) (1.46) (-3.94) (3.82)
Panel B: Residual Institutional Ownership
Low ResInst 0.65 -1.28 1.93 0.04 -1.19 1.23
(2.21) (-2.23) (3.90) (0.20) (-3.20) (2.90)
High ResInst 0.99 -0.76 1.75 0.20 -0.65 0.84
(3.27) (-1.27) (3.41) (1.11) (-1.58) (1.80)
Panel C: Residual Analyst Coverage
Low ResAn 0.77 -1.74 2.51 0.10 -1.66 1.76
(2.88) (-3.22) (5.46) (0.59) (-4.78) (4.34)
High ResAn 0.80 -1.02 1.82 0.04 -1.04 1.09
(2.70) (-1.86) (4.03) (0.25) (-3.10) (2.81)
Panel D: Firm Age
Low Age (Young) 0.88 -1.48 2.36 0.23 -1.28 1.51
(2.76) (-2.70) (5.37) (1.21) (-4.19) (4.06)
High Age (Old) 0.69 -0.78 1.48 -0.02 -0.91 0.89
(2.56) (-1.33) (2.85) (-0.12) (-2.08) (1.86)
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Figure 2.1: Performance of Healthy and Distressed Stocks, 1981 – 2014
This figure displays the cumulative returns to four di↵erent portfolios over the sample period of
1981 to 2014. The four portfolios include: (1) the decile portfolio with the lowest default risk
“healthy stocks”; (2) the decile portfolio with the highest default risk “distressed stocks”; (3) the
market portfolio consisting of all CRSP firms incorporated in the U.S.; and (4) a risk-free asset,
which is proxied by the one-month Treasury Bill. The right margin of the table displays the final
dollar values of each portfolio at the end of the sample period, given a $1 investment at the start of
January 1981. Cumulative returns to stock portfolios are computed using monthly value-weighted
returns.
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Figure 2.2: Performance of High and Low External Financing Distressed Stocks
This figure displays the cumulative returns to four di↵erent portfolios over the sample period of 1981
to 2014. The four portfolios include: (1) the portfolio of firms in the highest quintile of default risk
and lowest quintile of external financing “Distressed-Low XFIN”; (2) the portfolio of firms in the
highest quintile of default risk and highest quintile of external financing “Distressed-High XFIN”;
(3) the market portfolio consisting of all CRSP firms incorporated in the U.S.; and (4) a risk-free
asset, which is proxied by the one-month Treasury Bill. The right margin of the table displays
the final dollar values of each portfolio at the end of the sample period, given a $1 investment at
the start of January 1981. Cumulative returns to stock portfolios are computed using monthly
value-weighted returns.
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Chapter 3
Financial Distress, Corporate Takeovers, and Stock Re-
turns
90
3.1 Introduction
Financial theory suggests that distressed firms should earn higher returns to compensate in-
vestors for bearing greater risk; however, the existing literature finds they earn puzzlingly low stock
returns (Dichev, 1998; Campbell et al., 2008; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Garlappi and Yan,
2011; Friewald et al., 2014; Conrad et al., 2014). The inability of asset pricing models to explain
the underperformance associated with low failure risk firms has resulted in a “distress anomaly”. I
attempt to shed light on this puzzle by examining the relation between financial distress, takeover
probability, and future returns.
Many distressed firms possess a greater likelihood of being acquired in a takeover due to their
smaller market capitalizations, relatively low valuations, and the opportunity for acquirers to im-
prove the profitability of existing operations. However, firm characteristics result in considerable
variation in the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid, as some firms are more attractive targets
than others, and this variation can have a significant impact on future performance. I evaluate
two hypotheses that predict a strong relation between takeover exposure and future distressed firm
performance but o↵er competing predictions.
The first hypothesis is based on a risk-based explanation, as the possibility of corporate takeover
reduces the risk that a firm reaches bankruptcy. Not only does a high probability of being rescued
via acquisition result in a firm being less risky than its financial statements suggest, the target
firm’s shareholders also typically enjoy the benefit of receiving a large bid premium if a takeover
occurs.36 Due to the reduction in risk resulting from takeover exposure, the risk-based hypothesis
predicts that distressed firms will earn lower returns if their probability of being acquired is high.
Alternatively, the managerial alignment hypothesis focuses on the role of takeover exposure
as a governance mechanism, which reduces misalignment between the interests of managers and
shareholders. Specifically, the managers of distressed firms have an incentive to take less risk than
desired by shareholders, including foregoing positive expected NPV projects, in order to minimize
the risk of failure. When a firm reaches bankruptcy, the CEO is unlikely to obtain another executive
position or remain in charge of the current company in a reorganization (Eckbo et al., 2016);
therefore, managers’ risk aversion and career concerns can create substantial agency conflicts. A
36Andrade et al. (2001) report a median bid premium of 37.9% during their sample spanning from 1973 to 1998.
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high probability of takeover mitigates this issue by lessening failure risk and creating an active
market for corporate control, which incentivizes managers to make value maximizing decisions. In
contrast, among firms with a low probability of becoming a takeover target, managers can opt to
“play it safe” by avoiding investment in risky projects. Thus, the managerial alignment hypothesis
predicts distressed firms will underperform when the probability of takeover is low.
I explore the interaction between takeover probability and distressed firm performance by es-
timating each firm’s probability of becoming a takeover target in the following year. Evidence
from portfolio tests supports the managerial alignment hypothesis, as the distress anomaly is con-
centrated in the group of low takeover exposure firms. A portfolio that goes long healthy firms
and short distressed firms earns large and significant abnormal returns within this subgroup of
stocks, whereas similar long-short portfolios generate small and insignificant returns among mod-
erate and high takeover probability firms. This result suggests the distress anomaly only exists
among a subset of stocks. Cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions yield similar findings
as a distress-takeover interaction term indicates a high probability of takeover is associated with
significantly higher future returns among distressed stocks consistent with the disciplining e↵ect of
potential takeover.
The managerial alignment hypothesis suggests that distressed firm managers have an incentive
to engage in value-destroying decisions that reduce firm risk when takeover exposure is limited. I
investigate whether this is manifested in future operating performance and find evidence of reduced
risk taking behavior that results in poor overall performance. Specifically, distressed firms with a
low likelihood of being acquired invest less, reduce leverage, and experience lower future cash flows
and profitability. This is consistent with distressed firm managers placing greater importance on
personal career concerns than the maximization of firm value.
In a related study, Gormley and Matsa (2016) examine managers’ incentives to play it safe and
provide evidence that after managers are insulated by the adoption of state-level antitakeover laws,
they undertake value-destroying diversifying acquisitions that involve acquiring companies that are
likely to reduce their firm’s risk.37 The acquisitions are shown to be associated with significantly
lower announcement returns and are more prevalent among CEOs under age 55, who they claim
37Gormley and Matsa (2016) focus on the adoption of business combination laws, which were passed in more than
30 states between 1985 and 1991. Given that these event dates are concentrated before the start of my sample period,
I focus on firm level di↵erences in the likelihood of being acquired.
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have more to gain from reducing risk as the result of having more years remaining in their careers.
In this study, I explore an additional source of career concerns related to the risk of firm failure.
To my knowledge this is the first study to examine the relationship between takeover likelihood
and the distress anomaly at the firm level. Eisdorfer et al. (2014) explore the distress anomaly in
an international setting using data from 34 countries and provide evidence on the potential drivers
of the returns to distressed stocks. One of the factors they consider is the strength of country-
level takeover legislation, and their results are in agreement with a risk-based explanation as they
find the distress anomaly is stronger in countries with more takeover-friendly laws. However, they
provide evidence that other country-level di↵erences contribute to their findings, and while they
provide a thorough country-level analysis there are several advantages to exploring a firm-specific
takeover measure among U.S. firms.
First, the distress anomaly has been documented in numerous studies using primarily U.S.
stocks, and there is evidence that the e↵ect has remained significant over an extended period of time.
While international evidence suggests the distress anomaly is also present in several other countries,
it appears to be less pronounced in some countries and nonexistent in others. By focusing on the
U.S. sample, I am able to avoid having to control for additional sources of heterogeneity related
to country-level di↵erences while benefiting from the use of a firm-specific measure of takeover
exposure that exhibits considerable variation.
Additionally, there is greater data availability and accounting data are more reliable for domestic
firms; therefore, I am able to use the Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008, hereafter CHS)
measure of distress. This measure is developed using a logistic regression model to predict failure,
and it includes both accounting and market variables as predictors. CHS (2008) and Eisdorfer
et al. (2014) also find the distress anomaly appears weaker when using alternate proxies for distress,
such as the distance-to-default measure, consistent with evidence that the CHS variable measures
financial distress more precisely.
Although this is the first study to examine the e↵ect of firm-level takeover exposure on the
distress anomaly, prior literature has highlighted that distressed firms are generally more likely
to become takeover targets. For instance, Wruck (1990) finds that roughly 7% of companies that
undergo a legal bankruptcy in the U.S. are acquired by other firms. An even greater number of
companies are likely to complete merger deals prior to reaching bankruptcy in order to avoid the
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high associated costs. However, I show that while distressed companies are more likely to become
takeover targets on average, some firms possess characteristics that make them unattractive to
potential acquirers, which reduces the disciplinary role of takeovers (Scharfstein, 1988). As a
result, agency conflicts are expected to be severe and appear to hinder future performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the hypotheses for the
impact of takeover exposure on distressed firm performance. Section 3.3 introduces the distress
and takeover models and also provides summary statistics. Section 3.4 tests the hypotheses and
presents the main empirical results. Section 3.5 provides a series of robustness tests. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Hypotheses
Alternative and competing predictions exist for the impact of takeover exposure on distressed
firm performance. This section discusses these hypotheses, which suggest the distress anomaly will
either be concentrated among firms with high takeover exposure, low takeover exposure, or that
takeover exposure will have no significant e↵ect on distressed firm performance.
3.2.1 Risk-Based Hypothesis
Failure models assess the degree of distress risk by estimating the probability a firm will fail
within a specified time horizon. The majority of these models use predictors based on financial state-
ment information which is then occasionally supplemented with stock market data, and although a
variety of distress measure exist, there is general agreement that firms experiencing negative profits
and recent stock price declines have a higher likelihood of failing. Corporate takeovers, however,
can prevent a firm from ever reaching bankruptcy. Thus, while a firm may be experiencing signifi-
cant operating losses and have limited long-run viability, if its characteristics make it attractive to
potential acquirers its true failure risk will be substantially lower than it appears.
The risk-based hypothesis predicts the distress anomaly will be concentrated among firms with
high takeover exposure. While traditional measures of distress risk suggest these firms have a high
chance of failure based on their poor operating performance, a high probability of being acquired
reduces this risk, thereby making these companies relatively safe. Additionally, the subgroup of
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firms that are successfully acquired are likely to experience large positive stock returns given the size
of the typical bid premium. Consequently, the risk-based explanation suggests distressed firms with
high takeover probability should earn lower returns, whereas distressed firms with a low probability
of being rescued via takeover should earn higher returns as compensation for the greater chance of
experiencing bankruptcy. This explanation is consistent with the evidence presented in Eisdorfer
et al. (2014) who explore the impact of takeover friendly legislation in an international sample and
provide evidence that the distress anomaly is stronger in countries with more friendly takeover
laws. I explore whether a similar e↵ect can explain the underperformance of distressed stocks in
the U.S. using firm-level di↵erences in takeover likelihood.
3.2.2 Managerial Alignment Hypothesis
A substantial body of work explores the disciplinary role of corporate takeovers on managerial
behavior. Because agency conflicts can allow managers to engage in empire building activities that
generate private benefits for themselves (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964), exert less
e↵ort than desired by shareholders in order to enjoy the “quiet life” (Ho¨lmstrom, 1979; Grossman
and Hart, 1983; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003), or take value destroying actions that reduce firm
risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Gormley and Matsa, 2016), the possibility of a corporate takeover
places pressure on management to work in the best interest of shareholders or risk losing control.
In the case of highly distressed firms this disciplining mechanism is of particular value, because
managers have an incentive to “play it safe” in order to protect their position, and failures often
have large negative consequences for the CEO. For instance, Eckbo et al. (2016) explore a sample
of firms filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and find that approximately two-thirds of incumbent
CEOs leave the executive labor market during the bankruptcy event period and su↵er substantial
wealth losses as a result, thereby creating an incentive for managers to avoid risky projects. In
contrast, shareholders benefit when the firm undertakes any positive NPV project, including risky
ones that may result in a higher chance of failure.38 Consequently, the possibility of a corporate
takeover should mitigate this agency conflict and create greater alignment between managers’ and
shareholders’ interests.
38It is worth noting that the value of shareholders’ option to default is also increasing in the volatility of the firm
as noted by Eisdorfer et al. (2013).
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The managerial alignment hypothesis therefore predicts the underperformance of distressed
company stocks will be concentrated among low takeover exposure firms. In particular, distressed
firm managers who are insulated from the possibility of takeover are more likely to forego profitable
opportunities due to career concerns and risk aversion related to uncertain project outcomes. If
investors do not fully account for the impact of agency conflicts, such value destroying decisions
are expected to be associated with long-run stock price underperformance resulting in a “distress
anomaly” among low takeover exposure firms. Conversely, when takeover probability is high, man-
agers are incentivized to act in shareholders’ best interest in order to maintain control. Therefore,
this hypothesis predicts high takeover exposure distressed firms will earn returns commensurate
with their level of risk.
3.2.3 No Relation Hypothesis
A third possibility is that if the probability of receiving a takeover bid is properly accounted for
by investors and reflects a source of unsystematic risk that is unrelated to future firm performance,
then takeover likelihood should have no relation to the distress anomaly. The returns to the portfolio
of distressed firms with the highest likelihood of being acquired are still expected to fluctuate with
the amount of realized takeovers; however, abnormal returns should be zero on average. Therefore,
the no relation hypothesis predicts the strength of the distress anomaly will be similar across all
levels of takeover likelihood. Given the documented underperformance of distressed firms over time,
this hypothesis merely rules out takeover exposure as an explanation for the distress anomaly as it
cannot account for prior findings.
3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
3.3.1 Financial Distress Variable
I use the Campbell et al. (2008) measure of financial distress (i.e., CHS) to estimate the
failure probability for each firm. The CHS failure model has the advantage of incorporating both
market and accounting data and is shown to have better predictive power than competing models.39
39The distress measures from Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) are frequently used in earlier studies on financial
distress; however, Franzen et al. (2007) provide evidence that purely accounting-based models of distress have become
less accurate in more recent periods. Additionally, the Moody’s KMV model which relies on the structural default
model of Merton (1974) has received considerable use from both academics and practitioners but has been found to
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Following Campbell et al. (2008), I combine monthly market data from CRSP with quarterly
accounting data from Compustat, where accounting information is lagged to ensure it is publicly
available. The CHS distress variable used to estimate the probability of failure with a twelve month
forecast horizon is then computed as follows:
CHSit =   9.16  20.26NIMTAAV Git + 1.42TLMTAit   7.13EXRETAV Git
+ 1.41SIGMAit   0.045RSIZEit   2.13CASHMTAit + 0.075MBit
  0.058PRICEit (3.1)
where NIMTA is net income divided by the market value of assets, TLMTA is the book value of
liabilities divided by the market value of assets, EXRET is the log of the excess return on the
firm’s stock relative to the S&P 500 Index, SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily returns over
the past three months, RSIZE is the ratio of the log of the firm’s market capitalization divided by
that of the S&P 500 index, CASHMTA is the firm’s cash and short-term investments scaled by the
market value of assets, MB is the market-to-book ratio, and PRICE is the log of the firm’s price
per share truncated from above at $15. NIMTAAVG and EXRETAVG represent weighted moving
averages of NIMTA and EXRET. I construct them following CHS (2008) as shown below,
NIMTAAV Gt 1,t 12 =
1   3
1   12 (NIMTAt 1,t 3 + . . .+  
9NIMTAt 10,t 12) (3.2)
EXRETAV Gt 1,t 12 =
1   
1   12 (EXRETt 1 + . . .+  
11EXRETt 12) (3.3)
where   = 2 
1
3 . All inputs are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles of the pooled sample. To
limit transaction costs and the e↵ects of bid-ask bounce, I eliminate all stocks with prices below $1
at the time of portfolio formation.40 Given the focus on firms experiencing financial di culties, it is
also important to incorporate delisting returns. I use the CRSP reported delisting return whenever
available if a firm’s final monthly return is missing, and I compound the returns if one is present.
I then combine the stock market and accounting data with takeover information from Thomson
One Banker. The takeover data becomes available in 1980, and I use the first ten years to generate
out-of-sample takeover probability forecasts in order to avoid look-ahead bias. The following period
spanning 1990 to 2013 is then used throughout the remaining analysis to test the impact of takeover
contribute minimal explanatory power beyond that captured by the CHS measure.
40See CHS (2008) for a detailed description of distress variable construction.
97
likelihood on distressed firm performance. The sample includes all common equity securities (share
code 10 or 11) with non-missing data listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ except for utility
(SIC codes 4900 to 4999) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 6999), which are highly regulated
entities and also exhibit di↵erences in operating structure.
To evaluate the strength of the distress anomaly in the current sample, I sort stocks into five
portfolios each month based on their computed CHS distress value. Table 3.1 reports both descrip-
tive statistics and performance measures for each of the distress quintile portfolios. The charac-
teristics displayed include size, market-to-book, past return from month t-12 to t-2, the standard
deviation of daily stock returns over the past three months (Sigma), leverage, return on assets (net
profit), and the percentage of firms with positive income. For each characteristic, I first compute
the cross-sectional mean and median of all firms in each portfolio and then report the time series
average of these values. Several of the characteristics exhibit a monotonic relation with the level
of financial distress. For instance, distressed firms appear to have smaller market capitalizations
(size), lower market-to-book ratios, lower past returns, higher return standard deviations, higher
book leverages, and lower profitability ratios.
The table also reports the performance of each distress portfolio and a zero net-investment
portfolio that is long stocks in the least distressed quintile (D1) and short stocks in the most
distressed quintile (D5). I report average monthly excess returns relative to the risk-free rate as
well as alphas relative to the CAPM, Fama-French 3-factor model, and Carhart 4-factor model.41
The first four distress quintile portfolios earn average excess returns ranging from 51 to 69 basis
points per month; however, the portfolio of highly distressed firms, despite consisting of firms
that are much riskier by standard measures, only averages an excess return of 18 basis points
per month. Thus, when adjusting for risk using the CAPM and Fama-French 3-factor model,
the underperformance of the high distress portfolio (D5) becomes even more pronounced. The D5
portfolio has large loadings on the market, size, and value factors, which causes its abnormal returns
to be significantly negative, and the long-short portfolio earns a significantly positive abnormal
return of 1.16% (t = 2.86) relative to the CAPM and 1.34% (t = 3.67) relative to the Fama-French
3-factor model. The addition of the momentum factor, UMD, in the 4-factor model explains much
of the underperformance associated with distressed stocks; however, the alpha remains economically
41I obtain monthly data on the risk-free rate and asset pricing factors from Ken French’s website.
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large and statistically significant (0.57%, t = 2.17), which confirms the existence of the distress
anomaly documented in prior studies.
3.3.2 Takeover Probability
To estimate the likelihood that a given firm will become a takeover target within the following
year, I obtain historical data on all mergers and acquisitions of publicly traded firms from Thomson
One Banker. Following the takeover literature, I exclude bids classified as acquisitions of partial
stakes, minority squeeze-outs, buybacks, and recapitalizations in order to only capture takeover
events that are expected to have a substantial impact on firm value. I define a dummy variable,
TO, which takes the value of one if a firm is a takeover target in year t and zero otherwise.
I estimate takeover probability using a model that includes the independent variables from
Billett and Xue (2007). Their model has the advantage of including the primary takeover predictor
variables that have been documented in the mergers and acquisitions literature while posing minimal
data availability limitations.42 The logit model used to obtain a predicted value of being acquired
within the next year is as follows:
logit(TOit) = ln
✓
TOit
1  TOit
◆
=  0Xit 1 (3.4)
where Xit is a vector containing a constant and firm specific characteristics. The explanatory
variables are computed using each firm’s most recent fiscal year-end accounting data. These include
ROAIA, SIZEEQ, LEVBIA, MKBK, SALEGR, NPPE, ITODUM, and year indicator variables,
where ROAIA is operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets less the industry
median ratio, SIZEEQ is the log of the market value of equity adjusted to 2012 dollars using the
consumer price index, LEVBIA is the ratio of debt to total assets less the industry median leverage
ratio, MKBK is the ratio of market equity to book equity, SALEGR is the log of the ratio of current
sales to prior year sales, NPPE is net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets, and
ITODUM is a variable that takes the value of one if there was a takeover attempt within the firm’s
industry in the prior year and zero otherwise. Industry adjustments are made by subtracting the
42Approximately 10 percent of firm-month observations are eliminated because of a missing CHS distress variable;
however, the takeover probability can be estimated for all of the remaining firms. The main sample contains 805,555
firm-month observations over the period 1990 to 2013.
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median value of all firms with the same two-digit SIC code, and ITODUM is based on takeovers
with the same four-digit SIC code. Annual accounting variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile to reduce the e↵ect of outliers.
I estimate the likelihood that each firm will receive a takeover bid within the following twelve
months using an expanding-window estimation. The takeover model is first estimated using his-
torical data from the period 1980 to 1989 to predict the likelihood of being acquired in 1990. The
model is then re-estimated each year using all available data to generate the subsequent forecast.
Table 3.2 presents the logit model estimation results for the full sample period. Overall, the esti-
mated coe cients are consistent with findings in the prior literature. Large firms and firms with
high market-to-book ratios are significantly less likely to become takeover targets. This result is
intuitive as fewer firms have the resources necessary to acquire a large company, and evidence in
Hertzel and Li (2010) suggests market-to-book ratios may reflect both a growth option component
as well as a mispricing component, thereby creating an incentive to acquire firms with depressed
market values that trade at a bargain price. The results also indicate that firms with higher book
leverage are also more likely to become takeover targets. This result, while less intuitive, is con-
sistent with evidence documented in Cremers et al. (2009). Further, firms with high amounts of
fixed assets, as measured by NPPE, are less likely to be acquired, and firms within an industry
that experienced at least one takeover bid within the prior year are more likely to be acquired.
Although the coe cients are unreported, year controls are also included to control for the high
concentration of takeover events in particular time periods.
Overall, the model is highly significant with a p-value of less than 0.0001, and the pseudo
R2 is comparable to that reported in the prior literature.43 While it is challenging to predict
whether a specific firm will receive a takeover bid in a given year, the model does a good job of
separating firms with a relatively high or low likelihood of being acquired as illustrated by Figure
3.1. When sorting firms into takeover likelihood quintile portfolios, the percentage of realized
takeovers occurring within each portfolio increases monotonically with the predicted probability
and ranges from 13.97% for the lowest takeover probability portfolio to 25.35% for the highest.
Thus, reliable di↵erences in takeover exposure appear to exist among firms when evaluated at the
portfolio level.
43For reference, Cremers et al. (2009) report a pseudo R2 of 1.76% in their base model predicting takeover attempts.
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3.3.3 Double-Sorted Portfolio Characteristics
To explore the interaction between financial distress and takeover exposure, I sort all firms into
portfolios based on these two measures. In particular, stocks are independently sorted into five
quintiles based on their level of distress, CHS, and into terciles based on their estimated takeover
probability, TO. Table 3.3 displays the average characteristic values for firm size, market-to-book
ratio, cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2, the number of stocks in each portfolio, CHS
distress, and estimated takeover probability. All reported figures are obtained by first computing
the cross-sectional average of all firms in the portfolio and then computing the time series average
of these values.
Panel A reveals that the average size of firms varies greatly across both the level of distress and
takeover likelihood. Within each takeover tercile, the average market capitalization decreases with
the level of distress, and within each distress quintile firm size increases as takeover probability
declines. This result is expected based on the negative size coe cients in the distress and takeover
models as well as basic economic intuition. Panel B displays average market-to-book ratios, which
highlights an interesting pattern. While the portfolios of distressed firms with high takeover ex-
posure (TO1) and moderate takeover exposure (TO2) exhibit the lowest average market-to-book
ratios, reflecting the tendency of distressed firms to have depressed valuations, the portfolio with
low takeover exposure (TO3) has an average market-to-book ratio that is among the highest at
2.42. These high valuations imply that either investors expect substantial growth from these firms
despite their distressed status and recent struggles, that investors have overvalued these firms’
stocks, or a combination of these two factors.
Panel C indicates that healthy firms tend to be winner stocks while distressed firms tend to
be loser stocks. This relation occurs largely by construction, as Equation 3.1 shows that a moving
average of excess returns is a key predictor of future failure events. As a result, it is important
to control for momentum when assessing the di↵erences in performance between healthy firms
and distressed firms. Panel D also reveals that the high distress, high takeover exposure portfolio
contains the greatest number of firms, as distressed stocks are generally more likely to become
takeover targets.
Additionally, panels E and F highlight that the sorting procedure is e↵ective at minimizing
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di↵erences in distress risk across portfolios within the same distress quintile as well as di↵erences in
takeover probability across portfolios within the same takeover tercile. This implies that di↵erences
in failure risk are unlikely to account for any observed di↵erences in the strength of the distress
anomaly across takeover exposure levels. The following section explores the performance of the
double-sorted portfolios while focusing on the interaction between the level of financial distress and
a firm’s likelihood to receive a takeover bid.
3.4 Results
This section tests the hypotheses and evaluates whether di↵erences in takeover exposure help to
explain the distress anomaly. The managerial alignment hypothesis predicts distressed firm under-
performance will be concentrated in low takeover exposure firms as the result of agency conflicts,
whereas the risk-based hypothesis predicts distressed firm underperformance will be concentrated
in high takeover exposure firms as a high probability of being acquired reduces the risk that a firm
will reach bankruptcy.
3.4.1 Asset Pricing Tests
Table 3.4 reports the performance of the fifteen double-sorted portfolios using time series asset
pricing regressions. Panel A displays average monthly returns in excess of the risk-free rate as
well as portfolio alphas relative to the CAPM, Fama-French 3-factor model, and Carhart 4-factor
model.44 Also reported are the returns to zero net-investment portfolios that are long high-takeover
firms and short low-takeover firms within the same distress quintile and portfolios that are long
healthy firms and short distressed firms within the same takeover likelihood tercile. Particular
attention is given to the latter group of long-short portfolios displayed in the final column (D1 –
D5), as they reflect the strength of the distress anomaly among firms with either high, medium, or
low probability of receiving a takeover bid.
The portfolio excess returns (upper-left) first reveal that within each distress quintile, high
takeover exposure firms earn a higher average return than low takeover exposure firms. The dif-
ference is not statistically significant in the bottom two quintiles, D1 and D2; however, it becomes
44The four factors included as independent variables include the market, size, and book-to-market factors of Fama
and French (1993) plus the Carhart (1997) momentum factor.
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significant within the top three distress quintiles (D3, D4, and D5). Further, the long-short port-
folio return is most significant, both economically and statistically, in the high distress quintile
(D5). A portfolio that is long distressed firms with the highest probability to be acquired and short
those least likely to be acquired yields an average return of 1.23% per month (t = 3.15). This
result is consistent with the finding in Avramov et al. (2013) that many asset pricing anomalies are
concentrated in high credit risk firms.
The performance of the distress-based long-short portfolios is of primary interest, since the focus
is on explaining the distress puzzle. I find a portfolio that is long healthy firms and short distressed
firms within the highest takeover likelihood tercile earns an insignificant average monthly return
of 0.28% (t = 0.57). This is inconsistent with the predictions of the risk-based hypothesis, which
suggests the distress anomaly should be more pronounced among high takeover exposure firms.
Likewise, a long-short portfolio constructed using firms within the middle takeover probability
tercile earns a return that is insignificant and economically small (0.31%, t = 0.58). In contrast,
within the lowest takeover exposure tercile, I find the distress anomaly is strong, as the long-short
portfolio produces a significant average return of 1.21% per month (t = 2.21). Additionally, the
short leg consisting of high distress, high takeover probability firms underperforms the risk-free
rate by an average of 54 basis points per month. This evidence is consistent with the managerial
alignment hypothesis in which managers fail to act in the best interests of shareholders when
shielded from the threat of takeovers resulting in poor future performance.
Next, I examine the performance of the long-short distress portfolios relative to asset pricing
factor models to evaluate whether known risk factors can explain the observed results. Similar
overall patterns in performance across takeover terciles are observed; however, the alphas relative
to the CAPM and Fama-French 3-factor models are much larger than the excess returns. Within
the high, moderate, and low takeover terciles the CAPM alphas are 0.83%, 0.97%, and 1.86% while
the 3-factor model alphas are even larger at 1.06%, 1.15%, and 2.00%, respectively. The larger risk-
adjusted returns are consistent with the results from Table 1, as each of the long-short portfolios
loads negatively on the market, SMB, and HML factors.
The strong pattern in past returns across the distress portfolios makes it important to control
for the e↵ects of momentum; otherwise, a large portion of the long-short portfolio abnormal returns
may be attributed to its well-documented e↵ects. Consequently, I place greater emphasis on the
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abnormal returns relative to the 4-factor model. Similar to the findings for excess returns, the
distress-based long-short portfolios earn small insignificant alphas among both high and moderate
takeover exposure firms. Despite the overall strength of the distress anomaly, this result suggests
it is basically non-existent in the majority of distressed stocks.
Within the group of low takeover likelihood firms, however, the long-short portfolio generates
a large and highly significant 4-factor alpha of 1.35% per month (t = 3.77). Thus, the distress
anomaly appears to be driven by high failure risk firms that are unlikely to receive a takeover bid.
Additionally, the majority of the long-short portfolio’s abnormal return is derived from the short
leg, which earns a 4-factor alpha of -1.30% per month (t = -4.09). In contrast, the portfolio returns
of healthy firms in the low takeover exposure group are well explained by the 4-factor model (0.05%,
t = 0.42). Overall, these findings are consistent with greater career concerns and risk aversion of
distressed firms’ managers creating unmitigated agency conflicts when the threat of takeover is low.
Panel B reports the factor loadings from the Carhart 4-factor model. This panel confirms that
the distress-based long-short portfolios (D1 – D5) load heavily on several of the standard asset
pricing factors. For instance, within each takeover group the healthy minus distressed long-short
portfolio has a significant negative loading on the market and size (SMB) factors and a significant
positive loading on the momentum (UMD) factor. This covariance in returns is expected given
the tendency for distressed firms to be small, volatile companies that have experienced substantial
losses during the prior year. Given the known relation between these factors and stock returns, it
is important to control for their e↵ects in order to test for an independent distress e↵ect.
3.4.2 Distress, Takeover Likelihood, and Future Operating Performance
The results from the portfolio tests provide evidence consistent with the managerial alignment
hypothesis, which predicts distressed firm managers will act in their own self-interest and play it
safe when their firm is unlikely to face a takeover attempt. Table 3.5 further explores this hypothesis
by examining distress, takeover probability, and their relation to future operating performance. I
conduct panel regressions where the dependent variable is one-year-ahead return on assets (ROA),
gross profitability (GP), cash flows (CF), capital expenditures (CAPX), cash holdings (Cash), or
book leverage (LEV). All dependent variables are scaled by total assets to account for di↵erences
in firm size, and all regressions control for the log of firm size, book-to-market, and age as well as
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firm and year fixed e↵ects. If a low likelihood of being acquired alters management’s decisions of
whether to engage in risky projects, this should be reflected in observable outcomes.
The primary variable of interest in the performance prediction regressions is the distress-takeover
interaction term, as this indicates whether the possibility of takeover has a greater disciplinary
e↵ect on distressed firm managers who face greater career concerns and have reason to be more
risk averse due to the possibility of failure. The first three regressions explore di↵erent measures of
profitability as the dependent variable: return on assets, gross profitability, and cash flows to assets.
As expected, firms tend to experience lower future profits following periods of distress as indicated
by the significantly negative coe cient on CHS. Additionally, firms with a high probability of being
acquired tend to experience marginally higher return on assets (Column 1) and significantly higher
cash flows (Column 3), which is consistent with the threat of takeover incentivizing managers to
maximize firm profits in general. Interestingly, the interaction term is significantly positive in all
three regressions. This adds support to the managerial alignment hypothesis and suggests distressed
firms that are insulated from the threat of takeover experience particularly poor future net profits,
gross profits, and cash flows.
Column 4 tests the relation between the distress and takeover measures and future capital
expenditures. The positive coe cient on the distress-takeover interaction term suggests distressed
firms with high takeover exposure invest significantly more in the following year compared to low
takeover exposure distressed firms. This result is consistent with the idea that managers have
an incentive to play it safe when distress is high and the likelihood of being acquired is low by
foregoing investment in risky projects. Column 5 indicates that firms with a high probability of
being acquired tend to have lower future cash holdings, although the takeover e↵ect does not di↵er
significantly with the level of distress, and the interaction term in Column 6 indicates that future
book leverage is lower for distressed firms when the probability of takeover is low. Overall, these
results support the managerial alignment hypothesis by providing evidence that distressed firms
take on less risk when takeover likelihood is low to the detriment of shareholders.
3.4.3 Fama-MacBeth regressions with distress and takeover likelihood
To further explore the relation between takeover likelihood and the performance of distressed
stocks, I conduct Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. This approach o↵ers the advantage of
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being able to simultaneously control for many characteristics known to be associated with the cross-
section of stock returns. Additionally, the interaction between the distress and takeover likelihood
measures can be explicitly modeled and tested while controlling for other return predictors. The
results of these cross-sectional regressions are reported in Table 3.6, and the main specification
shown in columns 4 and 5 takes the form:
Reti,t+1 =  0 +  1log(Sizei,t) +  2log(B/Mi,t) +  3PastReturni,t +  4Revi,t +  5CHSi,t
+  6TOi,t +  7CHS · TOi,t + ei,t+1 (3.5)
where the dependent variable is the monthly stock return in excess of the risk-free rate and the
independent variables include log market capitalization (Size), log book-to-market (B/M), cumu-
lative return from month t-12 to t-2 (Past Return), past one-month return (Rev), distress (CHS),
takeover probability (TO), and an interaction term between the distress and takeover variables. I
multiply all coe cients by 100 for readability and report t-statistics based on Newey-West corrected
standard errors (with twelve lags) to address potential autocorrelation issues.
The first regression specification reveals that all control variables enter with the expected signs.
The coe cient on size is negative but insignificant indicating a weaker size e↵ect following its
documentation by Banz (1981). I also find positive coe cients on book-to-market and past return
(momentum).45 Additionally, I find that stocks with high prior month returns tend to perform
worse in the following month, as the coe cient on Rev is negative and significant. This is consistent
with the evidence of short-term reversals found in Jegadeesh (1990). Specification 2 adds the CHS
distress variable, which enters with a negative coe cient (-1.198, t = -2.24) while specification 3
indicates that a firm’s takeover probability is positively associated with future returns (0.452, t =
5.08).
Specification 4 simultaneously controls for both financial distress and takeover exposure and also
includes a term for their interaction. I find the general e↵ects of takeovers and distress survive, and
their interaction is positive and marginally significant (1.099, t = 1.70). Specification 5 repeats the
analysis but uses data from the quarterly Compustat files to update each firm’s takeover probability
more frequently. Specifically, I construct the takeover predictors using the most recently available
data from quarterly financial statements together with the coe cients from equation 3.4 to estimate
45The insignificant coe cient on past return is largely attributable to the higher volatility of momentum in recent
years including the momentum crash in 2009 documented by Daniel and Moskowitz (2015).
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takeover probability. This measure has a correlation of 0.90 with the takeover probability estimated
using annual data but is likely to capture changes in a firm’s attractiveness to potential acquirers
in a more timely manner. I find the results are largely unchanged; however, the interaction term
is now significant at the five percent level as the coe cient’s standard error is reduced (1.092, t =
2.02). The results are consistent with the managerial alignment hypothesis that distressed firms
underperform significantly when there is limited potential for a takeover.
3.5 Robustness Tests
This section tests the robustness of the results from Section 3.4. In particular, I explore the
performance of the double-sorted portfolios over the business cycle, during di↵erent subperiods,
and with varying portfolio rebalancing frequencies. Further, I evaluate the performance of the
double-sorted portfolios when using the quarterly takeover measure.
3.5.1 Subsamples
In Table 3.7, Panel A tests whether di↵erences in performance over the business cycle can
explain the findings. The excess returns and 4-factor model alphas to the distress-based long-short
portfolios (D1–D5) are reported separately for periods of expansion and recession as defined by the
NBER, and the results indicate that the distress anomaly is much stronger when the likelihood of
becoming a takeover target is low during both expansions and recessions. The 4-factor alphas are
insignificant during both expansions and recessions among high and moderate takeover likelihood
firms but are large and significant among low takeover likelihood firms.
If di↵erences in systematic risk related to the business cycle were to explain the underperfor-
mance of the low takeover exposure distressed firms, this portfolio should perform relatively well
during recessions and relatively poorly during expansions, thereby o↵ering investors hedging bene-
fits to compensate for the lower average returns. The results presented here suggest this is not the
case as the high distress, low takeover likelihood portfolio performs significantly worse than similar
low distress firms in both periods, and the long-short portfolio returns are larger during recessions.
These results support the managerial alignment hypothesis, as the distress anomaly is concentrated
in firms with a low probability of being acquired and distressed firm managers’ incentives to play
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it safe should be greater during recessions when risk aversion and career concerns are likely to be
amplified.46
Panel B evaluates whether the results hold over time or are driven by the earlier or later part
of the sample period, as the performance of the long-short portfolios is reported separately before
and after the year 2000. Not only does this allow for the examination of portfolio performance over
time, but these two subperiods are characterized by very di↵erent market conditions. While the
1990s were a time of relatively strong growth and investor optimism, the period following the turn
of the century has included several large downturns with both the burst of the tech-bubble in the
early 2000s and the financial crisis of 2008.
The excess returns suggest that while the distress anomaly is consistently stronger among
low takeover exposure firms, distressed firms in general have not performed as poorly after the
year 2000. The sizable di↵erences across subperiods is largely attributed to the severe “crash” of
distress-based strategies experienced in 2009.47 The 4-factor alphas, however, indicate that after
adjusting for risk, distress firms with low takeover exposure have underperformed significantly in
both subperiods. The abnormal returns to the long-short portfolios were -0.03%, 0.03% and 1.62%
during the 1990s and 0.30%, 0.42%, and 0.95% during the 2000s within the high, medium, and low
takeover likelihood groups, respectively. If a risk-based explanation that takes into account the time-
varying marginal utility of wealth were to explain the results, it is expected that the high-distress,
low-takeover exposure firms would do very well in certain periods when marginal utility is high
despite earning low returns on average; however, Panels A and B find consistent underperformance
across all subperiods, which is consistent with the managerial alignment hypothesis.
Throughout the main analysis stocks are assigned to portfolios based on the most up-to-date,
publicly available information at the start of each month. While most distressed firms tend to stay
distressed for multiple months and the takeover measure is only updated annually, it is possible the
results only hold with frequent portfolio rebalancing. In particular, distressed firms that recover
could have strong future performance but experience most of their gains after exiting the highest
distress quintile. Panel C addresses this issue by considering di↵erent portfolio holding periods. In
46The lower t-statistic during recessionary periods result primarily from there being fewer recessionary periods
resulting in a larger standard error; however, the alpha is still large and significant at conventional levels.
47Eisdorfer and Misirli (2016) document that distressed stocks actually earned substantially higher returns than
healthy stocks subsequent to the most severe market downturns.
108
particular, I test the results when reassigning firms to one of the fifteen portfolios on a quarterly,
semi-annual, or annual frequency. The return patterns are generally similar to those presented
in Table 3.4 with monthly portfolio assignment. In each instance the outperformance of healthy
firms relative to distressed firms is greatest within the low takeover probability tercile, although the
return spread does gradually decline as the rebalancing frequency decreases. However, the 4-factor
alphas to the long-short portfolio of low takeover firms are significant at each rebalancing frequency
with values of 1.10%, 0.95%, and 0.93% with quarterly, semi-annual, and annual rebalancing,
respectively. Overall, portfolio holding periods do not seem to greatly alter the main results.
3.5.2 Quarterly Takeover Measure
In the takeover model estimated in Table 3.2 following Billett and Xue (2007), all of the predictor
variables are constructed using accounting information from 10-K filings. In this section, I consider
the impact of using publicly available accounting data from quarterly filings to update firm takeover
probabilities every three months. This allows the takeover measure to more readily reflect changes
in a firm’s financial condition that can make it a more or less desirable takeover target.
Table 3.8 presents the results for the double-sorted portfolios while using the same takeover
model but with quarterly accounting data. The results are generally similar to those presented
in Table 3.4. The excess returns (upper-left) and 4-factor alphas (lower-right) both indicate the
distress anomaly is concentrated among firms that face a minimal likelihood of becoming a takeover
target. The CAPM and 3-factor model alphas also indicate that the distress anomaly is stronger
among low takeover exposure firms but the alphas are again significant among all takeover groups,
which appears to be the result of a strong momentum loading. Previous work has primarily focused
on the existence of the distress anomaly across all firms, but the evidence here suggests the under-
performance is limited to firms that are more insulated from potential takeovers. Consequently,
this long-standing puzzle may not be a reflection of distress risk itself, but rather a manifestation
of severe agency conflicts among the distressed firms that are least likely to be acquired.
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3.6 Conclusions
Distressed companies are often attractive takeover targets as a result of their smaller size,
relatively low valuations, and the opportunity for an acquirer to better utilize the firms’ assets.
This study investigates how the likelihood of being acquired a↵ects the performance of distressed
company stocks and tests competing explanations that o↵er competing testable hypotheses. Specif-
ically, while a risk-based explanation predicts that a high probability of being acquired reduces the
true failure risk of distressed firms, which could lower investors’ required returns; a managerial
alignment hypothesis predicts that when distressed companies face a low probability of being ac-
quired, self-interested managers have an incentive to “play it safe” as the result of risk aversion and
career concerns leading to poor future performance and low stock returns.
I find evidence consistent with the managerial alignment hypothesis, as the underperformance
of distressed stocks is concentrated in firms with the lowest probability of receiving a takeover bid.
Within this subgroup of firms, a zero net-investment portfolio that is long healthy firms and short
distressed firms earns significant abnormal returns that are economically large and unexplained by
common risk factors, business cycle e↵ects, or particular subperiods. In contrast, a distress-based
long-short portfolio earns small and insignificant abnormal returns among firms with moderate
or high takeover exposure, which contradicts the risk-based hypothesis and suggests the distress
anomaly is driven by a minority of firms.
To test the relation between takeovers and the distress anomaly, I use the CHS measure of
financial distress as well as a measure of takeover likelihood estimated using historical takeover
data. Cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions yield similar results to the portfolio tests and
suggest financial distress is associated with significantly lower returns among firms with a low
probability of receiving a takeover bid. Additionally, predictive regressions that explore operating
performance outcomes add support to the managerial alignment hypothesis, as distressed firms
that are unlikely to be acquired invest less, decrease their leverage, and experience lower future
profitability. While playing it safe may benefit the manager by reducing the near-term probability
of going bankrupt, it appears to be at the expense of shareholders who seek an optimal return on
their investment. Although existing governance data is limited for distressed firms, future research
should look to explore whether additional governance mechanisms that reduce agency conflicts are
110
e↵ective at enhancing the performance of distressed, low takeover exposure firms.
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted on CHS Distress-Risk
This table provides descriptive statistics for quintile portfolios formed by sorting stocks into five
portfolios (least distressed, D1, to most distressed, D5) based on the CHS (2008) measure of financial
distress. The CHS variable is constructed using monthly market data and quarterly accounting
data. For each characteristic, I first calculate the cross-sectional mean and median of all stocks
in each portfolio. I then report the time series averages of these means and medians. Size is the
market value of equity (in millions of dollars). Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of
equity to the book value of equity. Past return (reported in percent) is the cumulative return from
month t-12 to t-2. Sigma (reported in percent) is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock
returns over the past 3 months. Leverage (reported in percent) is the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets. Net Profit (reported in percent) is the ratio of the prior year’s net income to total assets.
The percentage of firms with positive net income is reported subsequently. This table also reports
portfolio average monthly excess returns (relative to the risk-free rate) as well as factor model
alphas. Returns and alphas are reported in percent per month with the corresponding t-statistics
below in parentheses. The sample period is 1990 to 2013.
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D1–D5
Size Mean 6,234.3 4,435.7 2,395.3 1,015.3 218.2
Median 752.8 745.9 428.6 186.0 54.6
Market-to-Book Mean 2.32 2.25 1.98 1.79 1.69
Median 2.14 2.00 1.66 1.40 1.18
Past return Mean 32.8 26.8 21.8 14.7 -7.9
Median 21.2 14.4 7.3 -1.9 -22.7
Sigma Mean 37.8 42.2 49.0 60.8 87.8
Median 35.0 39.0 46.0 58.1 85.3
Leverage Mean 33.5 44.1 48.2 50.8 54.5
Median 32.0 45.4 49.9 52.4 56.1
Net Profit Mean 8.58 5.73 2.20 -3.13 -15.98
Median 8.45 6.05 3.87 1.45 -6.03
% Positive income Mean 93.7 88.7 78.7 61.7 31.5
Median 100.0 100.0 100.0 87.2 1.4
Excess return 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.51 0.18 0.52
(2.93) (2.77) (2.10) (1.15) (0.29) (1.06)
CAPM alpha 0.18 0.13 -0.03 -0.40 -0.98 1.16
(1.93) (1.85) (-0.24) (-1.90) (-2.81) (2.86)
3-factor alpha 0.23 0.14 -0.03 -0.44 -1.11 1.34
(2.50) (2.08) (-0.23) (-2.23) (-3.61) (3.67)
4-factor alpha 0.08 0.17 0.16 -0.13 -0.49 0.57
(0.99) (2.56) (1.58) (-0.75) (-2.13) (2.18)
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Table 3.2: Takeover Likelihood Estimation
This table presents the results from a logistic regression used to estimate the likelihood that a
firm will receive a takeover bid within the following year. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable that equals one if the firm is a takeover target in year t and zero otherwise, and all predictor
variables are constructed at the end of year t-1. The independent variables used to predict which
firms will receive a takeover bid are chosen following the model of Billett and Xue (2007). The
predictors include industry adjusted operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets
(ROAIA), the log of market equity inflated to 2012 dollars using the CPI (SIZEEQ), industry
adjusted leverage where leverage is total liabilities scaled by total assets (LEVBIA), the ratio of
market equity to book equity (MKBK), the log of sales divided by prior year sales (SALEGR), net
plant, property and equipment divided by total assets (NPPE), and a dummy variable that equals
one if a firm in the same industry (four-digit SIC code) was a takeover target in the past year
(ITODUM). Industry adjustments are conducted by subtracting the median value for all firms in
the same two-digit SIC code. All continuous predictor variables are also winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles to limit the e↵ect of outliers. Year indicator variables are included to control for
the clustering of mergers and acquisitions. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used in
obtaining the z-statistics, which are reported beneath the coe cient estimates in parentheses. The
model estimation is reported for the period 1980 to 2013.
ROAIA 0.118
(1.36)
SIZEEQ -0.040
(-6.24)
LEVBIA 0.536
(8.01)
MKBK -0.048
(-8.48)
SALEGR -0.024
(-0.63)
NPPE -0.174
(-2.98)
ITODUM 0.279
(9.90)
Year controls Yes
Percentage of targets 5.10
Log likelihood -23,800.17
Pseudo R2 0.0190
113
Table 3.3: Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted on Distress Risk and Takeover Likelihood
Each month I independently sort stocks into five distress quintiles (least distressed, D1, to most
distressed, D5) based on the CHS (2008) measure of financial distress and three takeover terciles
(most likely to receive a takeover bid, TO1, to least likely, TO3) based on the probability of
becoming a takeover target within the next year. The CHS distress variable is constructed using
monthly market data and quarterly accounting data. Takeover probability, TO, is estimated using
annual accounting data following the takeover model of Billett and Xue (2007). The characteristics
reported include size (market equity in millions of dollars), market-to-book ratio (market equity
divided by book equity), past return (cumulative return from month t-12 to t-2 in percent), number
of stocks (average number of firms per month), CHS (financial distress measure), and takeover
probability (the estimated probability of receiving a takeover bid in percent). Each month I compute
the mean characteristic values for the stocks in each portfolio, and I report the time series averages
of these values for the full sample period of 1990 to 2013.
TO1
(high)
TO2 TO3
(low)
TO1
(high)
TO2 TO3
(low)
Panel A: Size Panel B: Market-to-Book
D1 (healthy) 3,362.3 6,623.3 7,612.1 2.09 2.35 2.45
D2 3,072.9 4,155.6 5,379.7 1.97 2.21 2.51
D3 1,947.3 2,174.3 2,913.9 1.72 1.90 2.35
D4 692.7 1,183.4 1,240.5 1.50 1.65 2.30
D5 (distressed) 186.8 241.1 275.0 1.35 1.48 2.42
Panel C: Past return Panel D: Number of Stocks
D1 (healthy) 35.2 31.7 32.5 143 197 219
D2 27.6 26.1 27.4 172 184 204
D3 21.1 21.7 23.2 190 186 184
D4 13.0 13.8 16.8 204 187 168
D5 (distressed) -7.9 -9.3 -8.1 224 178 158
Panel E: CHS Panel F: Takeover Probability
D1 (healthy) 0.02 0.02 0.02 6.19 5.14 3.96
D2 0.03 0.03 0.03 6.28 5.13 3.99
D3 0.04 0.04 0.04 6.38 5.15 4.03
D4 0.08 0.08 0.08 6.53 5.16 3.99
D5 (distressed) 0.31 0.30 0.31 6.74 5.18 3.81
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Table 3.5: Distress, Takeover Exposure, and Future Operating Performance
This table reports estimates from panel regressions that explore the ability of distress and takeover
probability to predict future firm performance. The dependent variables are return on assets (Col-
umn 1), gross profits to total assets (Column 2), cash flow to total assets (Column 3), capital
expenditures to total assets (Column 4), cash holdings to total assets (Column 5), and total lia-
bilities to total assets (Column 6) in year t+1. The independent variables include CHS distress,
takeover probability (estimated probability of receiving a takeover bid in the following 12 months),
an interaction term between distress and takeover probability, the log of firm market capitaliza-
tion (Size), log book-to-market, and log firm age (years since firm entered Compustat database).
All estimated regressions include both firm and year fixed e↵ects and robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The sample period is 1990 to 2013.
Dependent Variable
ROA GP CF CAPX Cash LEV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHS -0.314 -0.142 -0.383 -0.099 -0.031 0.091
(-5.55) (-3.66) (-8.14) (-7.85) (-1.23) (2.23)
Takeover Probability 0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.010 -0.015 0.050
(1.94) (0.64) (2.31) (-12.20) (-10.29) (21.68)
CHS x Takeover Prob. 0.079 0.048 0.129 0.022 0.004 0.024
(4.49) (3.85) (8.74) (5.48) (0.50) (1.79)
Log(Size) -0.007 -0.039 0.013 -0.004 -0.015 -0.037
(-3.23) (-14.57) (6.75) (-4.97) (-10.71) (-17.66)
Log(B/M) -0.088 -0.088 -0.030 -0.032 -0.026 -0.044
(-29.05) (-27.49) (-10.79) (-27.99) (-13.41) (-15.57)
Log(Age) 0.005 0.032 0.009 -0.008 -0.003 0.034
(1.44) (7.04) (2.64) (-4.78) (-0.89) (8.47)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.6: Fama-MacBeth Regressions on Distress Risk and Takeover Likelihood
This table displays the results from monthly cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions.
The dependent variable is the stock return in excess of the monthly risk-free rate. The independent
variables include the log of market capitalization, log book-to-market, the cumulative return from
month t-12 to t-2 (Past Return), the return in month t-1 (Rev), the CHS measure of distress risk,
and the firm’s likelihood of being a takeover target within the next year. An interaction between the
CHS distress measure and the takeover probability is included in the final two columns. Columns
1 through 4 use annual accounting data to construct each firm’s takeover probability, while column
5 utilizes quarterly accounting data. I multiply all coe cients by 100, and report t-statistics based
on Newey-West corrected standard errors (with twelve lags) below in parentheses. The sample
period is 1990 to 2013.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(Size) -0.052 -0.081 -0.052 -0.086 -0.083
(-0.93) (-1.70) (-0.96) (-1.83) (-1.79)
Log(B/M) 0.390 0.365 0.287 0.251 0.266
(1.98) (1.87) (1.54) (1.37) (1.46)
Past Return 0.364 0.342 0.341 0.309 0.332
(1.47) (1.72) (1.37) (1.53) (1.66)
Rev(1 Mo) -2.477 -2.712 -2.570 -2.811 -2.839
(-7.08) (-7.64) (-7.36) (-8.05) (-8.13)
CHS -1.198 -4.591 -4.727
(-2.24) (-2.24) (-2.65)
Takeover Probability 0.452 0.371 0.367
(5.08) (4.77) (4.59)
CHS x Takeover Prob. 1.099 1.092
(1.70) (2.02)
Constant 1.328 1.582 -0.003 0.515 0.531
(2.27) (3.06) (-0.01) (1.08) (1.17)
Takeover Measure Ann Ann Ann Ann Qtr
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Table 3.7: Robustness of Distress Anomaly Across Takeover Exposure Levels
This table reports the performance of zero net-investment portfolios that are long stocks in the least
distressed, D1, and short stocks in the most distressed quintile, D5, within each takeover likelihood
tercile. The portfolios are formed by independently sorting stocks into distress quintiles based on
the CHS measure of financial distress and takeover terciles based on the estimated probability that
a firm receives a takeover bid within the following 12 months. Panel A reports the performance
of the long-short portfolios separately for periods of expansion and recession where business cycle
dates are defined according to the NBER’s determination of periods of expansion and contraction.
Panel B divides the sample into the 1990s (1990 – 1999) and 2000s (2000 – 2013). Panel C
highlights implements di↵erent holding periods in which portfolios are rebalanced either quarterly,
semi-annually, or annually. I report both excess returns (left-hand side) and Carhart 4-factor
model alphas (right-hand side). Returns and alphas are reported in percent per month with the
corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. The sample period is 1990 to 2013.
TO1 (high) TO2 TO3 (low) TO1 (high) TO2 TO3 (low)
Excess return 4-Factor Model alpha
Panel A: Business Cycle Periods
Expansion 0.39 0.14 0.96 0.49 0.13 1.02
(0.80) (0.27) (1.74) (1.45) (0.38) (2.77)
Recession -0.46 1.49 2.92 -0.33 1.54 2.62
(-0.23) (0.64) (1.40) (-0.28) (1.36) (1.98)
Panel B: Subperiods
1990s 0.63 0.60 2.05 -0.03 0.03 1.62
(1.10) (0.99) (3.37) (-0.07) (0.07) (3.71)
2000s -0.81 -0.62 0.25 0.30 0.42 0.95
(-1.22) (-0.96) (0.30) (0.64) (0.90) (1.88)
Panel C: Longer Horizon
3 months 0.28 0.60 1.05 0.13 0.56 1.10
(0.58) (1.14) (2.04) (0.40) (1.78) (3.33)
6 months 0.44 0.46 0.95 0.36 0.50 0.95
(0.97) (0.91) (1.86) (1.11) (1.54) (2.89)
12 months 0.10 0.41 0.64 0.36 0.74 0.93
(0.23) (0.82) (1.17) (1.01) (2.19) (2.59)
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Figure 3.1: Takeover Frequency By Predicted Takeover Probability Quintile
This figure displays the frequency with which firms receive takeover bids based on their predicted
takeover probability. Each year, I sort firms into five takeover portfolios based on their probability of
becoming a takeover target within the next 12 months, where takeover probability is estimated using
annual accounting data following the model of Billett and Xue (2007). I then plot the percentage
of total takeover bids received by firms within each takeover probability quintile portfolio. The
sample period is 1990 to 2013.
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